G.R. No. L-9808; August 20, 1914
TAN CHIN HIN, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondent-appellant.

FACTS:
Tan Seng, a Chinese boy claiming to be the 17-year-old legitimate son of Tan Chin Hin (a resident Chinese merchant in Manila), arrived at the port of Manila on February 13, 1914. The customs authorities refused him entry. After an investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry, by a 2-1 vote, found that Tan Seng was not the legitimate son of Tan Chin Hin, citing discrepancies in the testimony of witnesses regarding the ages of other children in the family and Tan Seng’s appearance being younger than claimed. The Insular Collector of Customs affirmed this decision. Tan Chin Hin then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The lower court, without first determining whether the customs authorities had abused their authority, proceeded to take new testimony on the merits of Tan Seng’s right to enter. The Collector of Customs appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to review the decision of the Collector of Customs by receiving new evidence on the right of the Chinese alien to land, absent a prior finding of abuse of authority by the customs authorities.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance and dismissed the habeas corpus petition.
The power to determine, in the first instance, the right of a Chinese alien to enter the Philippine Islands is vested by law in the executive department, specifically the customs authorities (the Board of Special Inquiry and the Collector of Customs). The decision of these authorities is final and conclusive unless it is shown that they have abused their authority. An abuse of authority exists only when there is no evidence to support their decision or when they have misapplied a clear provision of the law. The courts have no right to reexamine the sufficiency of the evidence or substitute their own judgment on the facts.
In this case, the burden of proof was upon Tan Seng to establish his right to enter. The record contained evidence (discrepancies in testimony and observations on appearance) upon which the customs authorities could base their denial. Therefore, there was no abuse of authority. The Court of First Instance exceeded its jurisdiction by conducting a new hearing on the merits without first finding an abuse of authority. Its order was set aside.