G.R. No. and Date: G.R. No. L-8813, February 23, 1915

FACTS:
The plaintiff, Simon Ungson, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of La Union to recover possession of a parcel of land. The defendant filed a general denial. After trial, the judge rendered a decision against the plaintiff, stating that the preponderance of proof did not support the plaintiff’s claim. However, the decision failed to state any findings of fact upon which this conclusion was based. The plaintiff appealed, assigning as error the lower court’s failure to make a statement of facts as required by law.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court’s failure to make findings of fact in its decision constitutes reversible error warranting the remand of the case.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that under Section 133 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions ( Act No. 190 ), judges of the Court of First Instance are required to make findings of fact upon which they base their conclusions. Citing a line of precedents (e.g., Braga vs. Millora, Enriquez vs. Enriquez), the Court ruled that the failure to do so is a fatal defect. Accordingly, the Court remanded the record to the lower court with the directive that the judge make a finding of facts based on the evidence already presented and return it to the Supreme Court within thirty days. No costs were awarded.

Separate Opinions:
Justice Torres concurred, with the observation that the judge on remand should not draw conclusions from or make findings upon the evidence.
Justice Carson concurred, acknowledging a potential issue if a different judge (not the one who tried the case) makes the findings on remand, as such findings would lack the weight derived from observing the witnesses. However, he noted the presumption that the same judge would still be in office and that the procedure was the most expeditious way to cure the defect.
* Justice Trent dissented. He argued that remanding the case solely for a finding of facts by a judge who did not preside over the trial (as was the situation here due to a judicial reorganization) was illogical and a vain act. He contended that the finding by a new judge, based only on the cold record, would not be entitled to the same weight on review. He believed the proper remedy was to treat the omission as a reversible error and order a new trial.