GR L 6991; (November, 1957) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-6991; November 29, 1957
JOHN LANDAHL, INC., plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO MONROY, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
On January 17, 1952, plaintiff John Landahl, Inc. filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover from defendant Francisco Monroy the sum of P6,939.98, plus interest and attorney’s fees. This amount represented the aggregate value of several articles received by the defendant from the plaintiff for sale on commission on three separate dates: April 26, 1948, May 3, 1948, and May 12, 1948, with the obligation to pay their value within 30 days from each receipt. The defendant raised the defense of bar by prior judgment, contending that on March 3, 1951, the plaintiff had already filed an action against him in the Municipal Court of Manila to recover an account that became due on June 19, 1948. The defendant argued that since the accounts sought in the present action had already matured at the time of the first suit, the plaintiff was obligated to include them in that earlier complaint, and its failure to do so now bars the present action under the rule against splitting a cause of action.
ISSUE
Whether the present action is barred due to the plaintiff’s failure to include the matured accounts in the prior action filed in the Municipal Court, thereby splitting a single cause of action.
RULING
No, the present action is not barred. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The rule against splitting a cause of action does not apply because the obligations sued upon arose from separate and distinct transactions or contracts, each creating an independent cause of action. The trial court correctly found that the defendant received merchandise on three different occasions under separate obligations to account for the proceeds within 30 days from each specific receipt. These contracts were independent of each other and the contract that was the subject of the prior Municipal Court case. Furthermore, the Court noted an exceptional circumstance: at the time the first action was filed, the vouchers covering the accounts in the present case had not yet been found and were unavailable, and the defendant had refused to acknowledge them without their production. These vouchers only became available after the first action was instituted. This situation constitutes a valid exception to the rule prohibiting the splitting of a cause of action. Therefore, the decision sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amounts claimed was affirmed.