G.R. No. L-64129-31 November 18, 1991
FERMINA RAMOS, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Fermina Ramos was the manager of Family Savings Bank (FSB), Tagum Branch. She was charged with three counts of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The informations alleged that on May 19, 1976, she conspired with co-accused individuals by allowing them to withdraw substantial sums against uncollected and uncleared check deposits, which checks were subsequently dishonored, causing damage to the bank. The trial court convicted Ramos not of estafa but of three counts of Estafa Thru Reckless Imprudence.
The Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction but modified the offense to estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence under Article 315(1)(b). The appellate court found that Ramos, as bank manager, acted with evident bad faith and malice. She repeatedly granted “DAUD” (drawn against uncollected deposits) accommodations to specific individuals despite knowing their prior checks were unfunded and despite explicit orders from her superiors to stop such practices. Furthermore, the proceeds of one withdrawal were deposited into her personal account.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly convicted petitioner Fermina Ramos of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code as a co-principal, instead of estafa through reckless imprudence.

RULING

Yes, the Court of Appeals was correct. The Supreme Court affirmed the finding that petitioner Ramos was guilty as a co-principal of estafa under Article 315(1)(b). The legal logic hinges on the presence of conspiracy, deceit, and abuse of confidence, which are elements of the crime, rather than mere negligence.
The Court ruled that Ramos’s actions constituted a clear abuse of confidence reposed in her as bank manager. Her deliberate and repeated authorization of withdrawals against unfunded checks, despite direct orders to cease such accommodations and her knowledge of the depositors’ bad checks, demonstrated malicious intent and active participation in a scheme to defraud the bank. This was not mere imprudence but a conscious design to perpetrate fraud. The instruction to bank personnel that she alone would handle transactions for these specific depositors, coupled with the deposit of one check’s proceeds into her personal account, provided strong evidence of conspiracy and personal gain. These acts were indispensable to the commission of the crime, making her a co-principal. Therefore, her liability is for the intentional felony of estafa, not the quasi-offense of estafa through reckless imprudence.