GR L 5888; (April, 1953) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-5888; April 22, 1953
ANTONIO T. CARRASCOSO, JR., plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE FUENTEBELLA, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr. filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to revive a judgment from a prior case (No. 55592) between the same parties. The judgment, dated June 28, 1940, and amended on August 6, 1940, ordered, among other things, that Carrascoso was entitled to a 16.52% interest in mining assets and payments received by Fuentebella, payment of specific sums (P4,130 and P165.20) with interest, and required Fuentebella to render a detailed accounting of expenses. Fuentebella appealed this judgment to the Court of Appeals, but the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the decision was interlocutory and the appeal premature. The Supreme Court sustained this dismissal, ruling the judgment was not final but merely interlocutory. After the war, Carrascoso petitioned for reconstitution of the lost record, which was granted over Fuentebella’s objection. The Supreme Court later held the reconstitution order was also interlocutory and not appealable. During these proceedings, the trial court ordered Fuentebella to render the accounting as per the judgment, but it does not appear this was complied with or enforced. Carrascoso’s present complaint seeks revival specifically for the total sum of P4,295.20 with interest and the delivery of shares of stock.
ISSUE
Whether the action for revival of judgment is proper, given that the judgment sought to be revived was declared by the Supreme Court to be interlocutory and not final.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the complaint. The Court held that under Section 6, Rule 39, only a final judgment may be revived by a separate action after five years. The judgment in question was expressly ruled by the Supreme Court to be interlocutory and not final, as it required an accounting and liquidation to be effected before a final judgment could be rendered. The Court noted that it was through Carrascoso’s own vigorous objections that Fuentebella’s earlier appeal was dismissed in its entirety as premature. Therefore, Carrascoso is estopped from asserting that the judgment or parts of it became executory. The only proper course is for Carrascoso to follow through with the order for accounting and liquidation so the case can reach a definitive, final judgment.