G.R. No. L-5099; April 29, 1953
Beatriz Cabahug-Mendoza, petitioner, vs. Vicente Varela, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and Domingo C. Mendoza, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Beatriz Cabahug-Mendoza filed a civil complaint (Civil Case No. R-1484) against her husband, respondent Domingo C. Mendoza, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on February 6, 1951. The complaint specifically prayed for: (a) separation of property, (b) administration by her of the conjugal assets, and (c) costs, along with a general prayer for other relief. It alleged that after their marriage in 1934, the husband, as manager of the conjugal partnership, began maintaining illicit relations with another woman under scandalous circumstances, leading the wife to institute a criminal case for concubinage. The complaint further averred that the husband, in maintaining these relations, had been wasting conjugal partnership properties through specific fraudulent transactions. The husband answered, denying guilt, and moved to dismiss the civil complaint, arguing it demanded legal separation based on unfaithfulness and thus could not proceed until the criminal action for concubinage terminated. The trial court initially denied the motion, noting the prayer was for “separation of property” not “separation of the parties.” However, upon motion for reconsideration, the court observed that the allegations of concubinage could entitle her to legal separation and ordered the suspension of the civil proceedings pending the criminal prosecution. The wife’s motion for reconsideration, reiterating that she sought only separation of property or administration, citing the concubinage as evidentiary of waste and mismanagement, was denied, prompting this special civil action.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge correctly ordered the suspension of the civil action for separation of property or administration of conjugal assets pending the termination of the criminal prosecution for concubinage, pursuant to Rule 107, Section 1(c) of the Rules of Court.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court directed the respondent judge not to suspend the civil action and to permit it to proceed. The Court held that the civil action for separation of property or administration by the wife is not founded upon the same offense (concubinage) that is the subject of the criminal proceedings. The petitioner had explicitly represented that she did not seek legal separation but only separation of property or administration, based on the husband’s abuse of his powers of administration (waste and mismanagement) under Article 167 of the New Civil Code. Consequently, the reference to concubinage in the complaint was merely evidentiary or incidental to the main cause of action for mismanagement, not the central point. Therefore, Rule 107, which mandates suspension of a civil action arising from the same offense as a pending criminal action, did not apply. The Court emphasized that the petitioner’s choice of remedy must be respected, and she would be held to her representation that she was not asking for legal separation.