G.R. No. L-47410. July 29, 1983.
POLICARPIO CASTRO and NATALIA DY CASTRO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRIQUE A. AGANA, SR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City, and VIMARCO, INCORPORATED, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Vimarco Incorporated filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages and preliminary attachment against petitioners Policarpio Castro and Natalia Dy Castro. Vimarco alleged that the petitioners, through deceit, obtained P250,000.00 to purchase and deliver copra but delivered only a portion, misappropriating the balance. The Court of First Instance (CFI) granted an ex-parte writ of attachment. After the petitioners filed their answer, the CFI granted Vimarco’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and rendered a decision on October 13, 1976, ordering the petitioners to pay P208,700.72 with interest and attorney’s fees.
The petitioners filed a notice of appeal, bond, and record on appeal on November 26, 1976. The CFI denied the appeal, finding it was filed out of time. It held that a copy of the decision was received by a clerk in the office of the petitioners’ counsel on October 26, 1976, as evidenced by a postal registry return card and the Postmaster’s Record Book. The reglementary period to appeal thus expired on November 25, 1976. The petitioners contested this, claiming receipt occurred on October 27, 1976. The Court of Appeals dismissed their subsequent petition for certiorari and mandamus, upholding the trial court’s finding that the appeal was one day late.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition and upholding the trial court’s denial of the petitioners’ appeal for being filed out of time.

RULING

No, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court, while generally adopting a policy of liberality towards the right to appeal to serve the ends of justice, emphasized that such liberality is not absolute. It must be balanced against the orderly administration of justice and the enforcement of procedural rules. The relaxation of procedural technicalities is justified only when it serves the greater interest of substantial justice.
In this case, the factual finding of the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, was that the petitioners’ counsel received notice of the decision on October 26, 1976. This finding was supported by substantial evidence: the registry return receipt and, more conclusively, the official Record Book of the Postmaster of Lucena City, which listed multiple registry items, including the one for the petitioners’ counsel, all received on October 26, 1976. The petitioners’ claim of tampering was unsubstantiated and inconsistent with the sequential entries in the official record. Their failure to perfect the appeal within the 30-day period from October 26 was therefore a clear procedural lapse.
The Court found no compelling reason to excuse this lapse. The petitioners failed to demonstrate that a denial of their appeal would result in a miscarriage of substantial justice. The core of the case was an admitted monetary obligation arising from contracts, and the equities leaned in favor of the private respondent, who had been awaiting payment for years. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the belated appeal, and it consequently did not err in dismissing the petition. The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit.