GR L 4605; (November, 1908) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-4605
IGNACIO REMONTAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEJANDRO CABACUNGAN, defendant-appellant.
November 4, 1908
FACTS: Ignacio Remontan filed a complaint against Alejandro Cabacungan for the immediate delivery of four parcels of land located in Aguitap, Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Remontan alleged that he purchased these lands more than twenty years prior from Cabacungan, Maxima Domingo (Cabacungan’s mother), and Mariano de los Santos, and that Cabacungan unlawfully took possession of them on June 28, 1907.
Cabacungan denied the sale, asserting that he, his sister Juana Cabacungan, and Adriano de los Santos merely mortgaged the lands to Remontan in separate transactions around 1894 and 1896 for various sums (e.g., P19 and a carabao for his own parcels). He claimed that in 1904, 1905, and 1907, he and the other mortgagors attempted to redeem the lands by offering payments of P100 and P120, respectively. However, Remontan refused the money, proposing instead that they pay him with 25 oyones of paddy, payable over five years. Cabacungan also denied being in possession of the fourth parcel of land, which he claimed belonged to Adriano de los Santos.
The Court of First Instance declared Remontan entitled to the possession of the lands, prompting Cabacungan to appeal.
During the appeal, the evidence showed:
Remontan’s witness testified about a purchase, seeing money change hands (P60 + carabao, P40, P30 for various parties), and a document that disappeared during the insurrection. The witness stated the lands were in “Bacbadoc,” not “Aguitap.”
Remontan presented an affidavit from Cabacungan, dated April 26, 1906, where Cabacungan stated he “sold with pacto de retro” two parcels of land for P60.
* Cabacungan testified that he never sold the land but only mortgaged it, without executing a document other than delivering the title deed. He claimed the notary who attested to the affidavit misled him into signing something stating a “sale with pacto de retro” when he had intended to acknowledge a mortgage. He maintained he tried to redeem the lands, but Remontan insisted on paddy payments instead of money.
ISSUE: Did Ignacio Remontan sufficiently prove his alleged title of ownership (purchase/sale) over the lands to warrant his claim for their recovery of possession?
RULING: No. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court, finding that Remontan failed to sufficiently prove his alleged title of purchase and sale.
The Court found that the essential elements of a contract of sale the identity of the thing, the certainty of the consideration, and the consent of both parties were not established:
1. Identity of the thing: The complaint described the lands as being in “Aguitap,” while Remontan’s own witness referred to them as being in “Bacbadoc.”
2. Certainty of the consideration: Remontan’s witness spoke of different prices (P60 and a carabao, P40, P30) for the various parcels, whereas Cabacungan’s affidavit (presented by Remontan) only mentioned P60 for two parcels. This discrepancy created uncertainty regarding the agreed-upon price.
3. Consent of both parties: Remontan claimed a simple “purchase.” However, his own documentary evidence (Cabacungan’s affidavit) stated a “sale with pacto de retro,” which is a distinct contract. Cabacungan consistently testified that the transaction was merely a “mortgage.” The fundamental disagreement on the nature of the contract (purchase, sale with pacto de retro, or mortgage) meant there was no meeting of the minds or mutual consent to a specific contract of sale.
Furthermore, Cabacungan retained possession of the first three parcels, which supported his claim that the transaction was a mortgage and his obligation was to pay in paddy, a fact not effectively disputed by Remontan. As for the fourth parcel, Cabacungan denied possession, and Remontan failed to prove otherwise.
Given the inconsistencies and lack of clear proof regarding the essential elements of a sale, the action for recovery of possession based on ownership could not prosper. The judgment of the lower court was reversed.
