GR L 4600; (February, 1952) (2) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-4600 February 28, 1952
PEDRO BABALA, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMINO ABAÑO, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS
Consequent upon a dispute over a market stall, an information for grave coercion was filed on January 26, 1951, in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, against petitioner Pedro Babala at the instance of respondent Patricio Canela. On the same date, respondent Canela filed a civil action for damages against petitioner Babala based on the same facts alleged in the information, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. In the civil case, the petitioner insisted that the criminal case should have precedence. The Court of First Instance issued an order dated February 6, 1951, providing that the trial of the civil case upon the merits was suspended until after the criminal case had been decided and terminated, but that the hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction could proceed. Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside this order, arguing that the criminal case suspended the trial of the civil case, including the matter of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
Whether the suspension of the civil action until final judgment in the criminal case deprives the court of authority to issue preliminary and auxiliary writs, such as a preliminary injunction.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. It ruled that petitioner’s contention was unfounded, citing the case of Ramcar, Inc. vs. De Leon (44 Off. Gaz., 3795; 78 Phil., 449). The Court held that although the civil action is suspended until final judgment in the criminal case, the court is not deprived of its authority to issue preliminary and auxiliary writs, such as preliminary injunction, attachment, appointment of receiver, fixing amounts of bonds, and other similar processes that do not go into the merits of the case. The reasoning was that if such ancillary processes could not be resorted to during the suspension, the rule providing only for suspension would be rendered senseless, as its effect would be to kill the action. The Court deemed it unnecessary to address respondents’ contention that the petition for certiorari and prohibition was defective for lack of verification. Costs were imposed against the petitioner.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Justice Pablo dissented for the same reasons expressed in his dissent in Ramcar, Inc. vs. De Leon.