GR L 3783; (January, 1952) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-3783; January 28, 1952
RUFINO DIMSON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
Plaintiff-appellant Rufino Dimson filed a complaint alleging he was in actual and peaceful possession of several lots in the Dinalupihan Estate, Bataan, since 1924 and 1940, having cleared, cultivated, and placed permanent improvements thereon. He claimed that since May 1948, the defendant-appellee Rural Progress Administration attempted to disturb his possession by placing other persons on the lots and, through threats and intimidation in June 1948, persisted in its intention to do so. He sought a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent this, which he alleged would cause him irreparable damage of at least P50,000, and prayed for confirmation of his possession and damages. The defendant filed an answer denying material allegations and, by way of special defense, alleged it was the owner and in possession of the lots since acquiring them from the registered owner, the Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank, as shown by a public instrument, and had leased the lots to other persons. The defendant also filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court held the complaint insufficient for failing to state a cause of action, ordered its amendment within five days, and directed dismissal upon failure. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied; he did not amend but appealed the dismissal order.
ISSUE
Whether the complaint states a cause of action for injunction to protect possession, given the defendant’s claim of registered ownership and the lack of an allegation of lawful possession by the plaintiff.
RULING
No, the complaint does not state a cause of action. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order of dismissal. For a plaintiff to be entitled to judicial protection of possession, it is essential to allege lawful possession. Lawful possession may be held by an owner, tenant, usufructuary, or other person to whom possession was lawfully transferred. Mere allegation of actual physical possession is insufficient. The answer, which was not denied by the plaintiff (who failed to amend his complaint), established that the lots were part of the Dinalupihan Estate covered by Torrens certificate of title No. 1301 in the name of Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank, which sold the estate to the defendant. Under the Torrens system, title to land covered by a Torrens title can no longer be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Consequently, no person can have lawful possession of the lots except by virtue of a contract, express or implied, transferring possession from the registered owner or its successor-in-interest. The plaintiff’s complaint lacked any allegation of such a lawful transfer of possession to him. Therefore, his complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of action.
