GR L 32613 4 Fernando (Digest)
G.R. No. L-32613-4. April 30, 1974. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. SIMEON N. FERRER, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I; FELICIANO CO alias “Leoncio Co” alias “Bob” and NILO S. TAYAG alias “Romy Reyes” alias “Taba”, respondents.
FACTS
This case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1700 , the Anti-Subversion Act, which criminalizes membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines and similar associations. The main decision, promulgated on December 27, 1972, upheld the validity of the statute. The present resolution addresses related matters, reinforcing the Court’s position that the law is a valid exercise of police power to protect the state from the clear and present danger of communist rebellion and subversion.
Justice Claudio Teehankee penned a separate opinion concurring with the result but dissenting on certain legal points. In contrast, Justice Enrique Fernando authored a dissenting opinion, reiterating his fundamental disagreement with the majority’s validation of the Act. His dissent centers on the perceived constitutional infirmities of the law, particularly its potential as a bill of attainder and its threat to freedoms of belief, expression, and association.
ISSUE
The core issue in the dissent is whether Republic Act No. 1700 remains constitutionally infirm for potentially operating as a bill of attainder and for posing a grave threat to fundamental freedoms, exacerbated by the court’s application of conspiracy principles.
RULING
Justice Fernando, in his dissent, maintains his position that the Anti-Subversion Act is unconstitutional. He argues that despite the majority’s well-reasoned efforts to apply basic guidelines for protecting constitutional rights during trial, the law’s inherent conflict with the bill of attainder clause and its impermissible inroads into freedoms of belief and association compel a contrary conclusion. He expresses specific misgivings about the majority’s reliance on the “conspiracy principle” to sustain prosecutions under the Act.
The dissent highlights the dangers of conspiracy law, citing U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson’s characterization of it as “elastic, sprawling and pervasive,” which can threaten fairness in justice administration. Fernando notes that conspiracy is a predominantly mental crime, based on a meeting of minds and intent, making it particularly susceptible to abuse in political contexts. He references legal scholarship warning that conspiracy prosecutions against political dissidents often risk punishing individuals for their speech and associations rather than their concrete actions. While not advocating for the complete abolition of conspiracy law, Fernando concludes that these inherent dangers, combined with his original objections to the Act’s validity, reinforce his grave doubts about the statute’s constitutionality. He therefore regretfully dissents from the resolution affirming it.