G.R. No. L-30085-87 December 26, 1974
PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION (PVTA), petitioner, vs. HON. WALFRIDO DELOS ANGELES as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City, Branch IV); UNITED NARVACAN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., respondents.

FACTS

Private respondents, various tobacco producers’ associations, filed three separate complaints against petitioner PVTA and Farmers’ Virginia Tobacco Redriers, Inc. (FVTR) before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They alleged that PVTA, through a management contract with FVTR, authorized the procurement of flue-cured Virginia tobacco. The plaintiffs delivered tobacco to FVTR, but payment was refused. PVTA, in its answer, admitted a contract with FVTR for only two million kilos and asserted that FVTR was solely liable for any shipments accepted beyond that authorized allocation, interposing a cross-claim against FVTR.
The cases were consolidated. During pre-trial, the parties submitted a “Stipulation of Facts” which was admitted by the court. Based on this stipulation, the trial court rendered a partial judgment on December 13, 1967, holding PVTA and FVTR jointly and severally liable to the plaintiffs for the value of the tobacco deliveries. PVTA filed a record on appeal. The trial judge, however, refused to approve it and set it for hearing, ultimately denying the appeal upon finding that the partial judgment had already been executed, with PVTA having accepted and made payments pursuant to it.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner PVTA’s appeal from the partial judgment.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus. The legal logic is anchored on the doctrine of estoppel by voluntary execution. The record established that the partial judgment sought to be appealed had already been executed. Petitioner PVTA had accepted payments from some private respondents as adjudged and had itself paid sums to others. This finding by the trial court was never refuted by PVTA in the proceedings below or in the petition before the Supreme Court.
A fundamental and long-standing principle in Philippine jurisprudence is that a party who voluntarily executes a judgment, either partially or in full, or who acquiesces in or ratifies its execution, is deemed to have waived the right to appeal from it. By availing itself of the benefits of the judgment and complying with its obligations thereunder, PVTA voluntarily abandoned its right to challenge the judgment via an appeal. Consequently, the respondent judge did not commit a gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or a culpable exercise of authority in denying the appeal. Mandamus, being an extraordinary writ, is not available to compel a discretionary act where no such grave abuse exists. The petition was therefore denied.