G.R. No. L-29557 February 29, 1972
ALFREDO D. TALOSIG, petitioner, vs. JULIANA PULANCO VDA. DE NIEBA, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Alfredo D. Talosig and respondent Juliana Pulanco Vda. de Nieba were involved in transactions concerning a house and rights to a lot. Nieba, the original grantee in a contract to sell with Magdalena Estates, Inc., transferred her rights over Lot 11 to Talosig via a deed of assignment dated December 6, 1952. Subsequently, on December 17, 1952, they executed a deed of sale for the house on the lot for P3,850.00. Nieba filed a complaint alleging that Talosig failed to reimburse her for prior installment payments made to the estate company and failed to fully pay the agreed price for the house and improvements. Talosig, in his answer, claimed full payment and ownership, attaching the deed of sale and asserting defenses under the Statute of Frauds.
The trial court ruled in favor of Nieba, ordering Talosig to pay the balance of the purchase price. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision with a slight modification in the computed balance. Talosig elevated the case to the Supreme Court via certiorari, raising several procedural and substantive errors.

ISSUE

The primary issues were: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in admitting parol evidence to vary the terms of the deed of sale; (2) whether the Statute of Frauds was applicable; (3) whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the case; and (4) whether the complaint stated a cause of action.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioner’s failure to object to the presentation of parol evidence during trial constituted a waiver of any objection to its admissibility. Furthermore, the deed of sale was not an “actionable document” requiring a sworn denial in this context, as the dispute centered on the actual payments made, not the document’s authenticity. The receipts of payment introduced by Nieba were properly considered to determine the unpaid balance.
Regarding the Statute of Frauds, the Court ruled that this defense was not raised before the Court of Appeals and was therefore deemed waived. On the jurisdictional challenge, the Court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged perfected contracts and sought specific performance of Talosig’s undertakings, which fell within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The claim that the complaint failed to state a cause of action for recovery of a portion of Lot 13 was immaterial, as the lower courts had already denied that specific relief, and a purported lack of cause of action does not divest a court of its jurisdiction over the subject matter. The findings of fact by the Court of Appeals, being final and conclusive, supported the judgment for the unpaid balance.