GR L 2789; (February, 1906) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-2789
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellee William Johnson filed an action for damages against defendant-appellant Cirilo David, alleging negligence by David’s cochero (driver). While Johnson was riding his bicycle on a bridge in Manila, he was struck and injured by a horse-drawn carriage owned by David but driven solely by the cochero. David was not present in the carriage at the time. The evidence established that the collision and resulting damage to Johnson’s bicycle and person were due to the cochero’s excessive speed and lack of reasonable care. The case originated in the justice of the peace court, was appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, and after a new trial was ordered, resulted in a judgment in favor of Johnson. David appealed, contesting his liability for the negligent acts of his employee.
ISSUE:
Is the owner of a carriage liable for damages caused by the negligence of his cochero, when the owner was not present and there is no showing of negligence in the selection or supervision of that employee?
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision. Applying Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code (which was then in force), the Court held that the obligation to answer for the negligent acts of another is limited to the specific relationships enumerated in those articles. Article 1902 covers liability for one’s own fault or negligence. The subsequent articles (1903-1910) specify the cases where a person is liable for the negligence of others (e.g., parents, guardians, employers, teachers, owners of buildings or animals). The Court found that none of these specific provisions imposed liability upon the owner of a vehicle for the negligent acts of his driver under the circumstances of this case, where the owner was not present and no independent negligence (such as in hiring a known incompetent driver) was proven. The Court distinguished this from liability under Article 1905 for damages caused by an animal, as the complaint was based on the driver’s negligence, not the animal’s behavior. Consequently, David, the owner, could not be held vicariously liable.
