GR L 26584; (July, 1969) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-26584 July 31, 1969
MARA, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ACE LUMBER CO., INC., respondents.
FACTS
Ace Lumber Co., Inc. appealed an adverse decision to the Court of Appeals (CA- G.R. No. 3637 -R). The appellate court dismissed the appeal for failure to submit the printed record on appeal on time via a resolution dated March 9, 1966, received by Ace Lumber on March 22, 1966. Fifteen days later, on April 6, 1966, Ace Lumber filed a motion for reconsideration. This motion was denied by the Court of Appeals, with notice of denial received by Ace Lumber on April 9, 1966. The very next day, April 10, 1966, Ace Lumber filed a second motion for reconsideration with leave of court. The Court of Appeals granted this second motion and reinstated the appeal. The appellee, Mara, Inc., contended that the second motion was filed on the sixteenth day and moved to declare the original dismissal final and executory. The Court of Appeals declined. Mara, Inc. then filed this petition for certiorari, charging abuse of discretion.
ISSUE
Whether a party who files a motion for reconsideration on the last day of the reglementary period may still validly take further steps to protect his interest (specifically, file a second motion for reconsideration) the day after receiving notice of the denial of the first motion.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, upholding the Court of Appeals’ action. The Court applied the doctrine established in Lloren vs. De Veyra (4 SCRA 637), which was subsequently incorporated into Section 3, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of 1964. The ruling states that when a motion for reconsideration (or new trial) is filed during office hours of the last day of the period for appeal, the appeal may be perfected within the day following receipt of notice denying said motion. The Supreme Court extended this doctrine to the computation of periods for the finality of orders of dismissal, emphasizing the need for a uniform method of computing periods to avoid confusion. The Court reasoned that the question in both Lloren and the present case is essentially the same: whether the judgment or order had acquired finality. The elimination of a specific proviso in the old rules regarding second motions for reconsideration was deemed not a departure from the Lloren doctrine but an adjustment for compatibility. Therefore, Ace Lumber’s second motion for reconsideration, filed the day after notice of the denial of the first, was timely, and the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in reinstating the appeal.