G.R. No. L-2618

FACTS:
On October 2, 1904, at the San Lazaro Race Track in Manila, the appellant, John M. Flemister, forcibly broke through a gate reserved for members of the Manila Jockey Club, assaulting the attendant, Domingo Salvador. Police Officer Feliciano Celimin, who was stationed nearby to maintain order, attempted to arrest Flemister for this breach of the peace. Flemister resisted arrest by striking Officer Celimin in the stomach and using vile and abusive language towards him and other police officers. Prior to the instant case, Flemister had been tried and convicted in the Municipal Court of Manila for a violation of a city ordinance (Ordinance No. 28, sec. 1) related to the disorderly conduct and assault on Salvador. He was acquitted of a separate charge under the same ordinance for using abusive language toward Captain Jose Crame.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the plea of autrefois acquit (double jeopardy) is valid, barring the prosecution under the Penal Code for acts already adjudicated under a municipal ordinance.
2. Whether the Supreme Court has the authority to increase the penalty imposed by the trial court upon an appeal by the defendant.

RULING:
1. No, the plea of autrefois acquit is not valid. The offense charged in the Court of First Instance (a criminal attempt against an agent of authority under Articles 249 and 250 of the Penal Code) is separate and distinct from the offense for which he was convicted in the Municipal Court (violation of a city ordinance for disorderly conduct). The laws emanate from different sovereignties (the general government via the Penal Code and the municipal government via its ordinance) and protect different public interests. Even if the acts arose from the same event, they constitute different offenses. Therefore, the prior prosecution does not bar the instant case.

2. Yes, the Supreme Court has the authority to increase the penalty on appeal. When a defendant appeals a conviction, he waives his right against double jeopardy for that offense and places the entire case, including the correctness of the penalty, before the appellate court for review. The Supreme Court has the power to render the judgment that should have been rendered by the trial court, which includes imposing the correct, and potentially more severe, penalty prescribed by law.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The judgment of the lower court is REVERSED. Appellant John M. Flemister is found guilty of a criminal attempt against an agent of authority under Article 249, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 250, paragraph 3 of the Penal Code. He is sentenced to two years and six months of prision correccional, the accessory penalties under Article 61, a fine of 3,750 pesetas, with corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency not exceeding one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs.