GR L 2531; (February, 1951) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-2531; February 28, 1951
Tomasa Salvante, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Bernardina Ubi Cruz, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
On September 30, 1936, Andres Calaycay obtained a judgment in Civil Case No. 4049 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, ordering that upon his payment of P725 to Bernardina Ubi Cruz, she must deliver a certain land to him and execute a deed of cancellation of Exhibit A. This judgment was not executed within the five-year period when it could be enforced by motion. On April 20, 1944, the plaintiffs, heirs of Andres Calaycay, filed an action against the defendant based on that judgment and deposited P725 in Japanese war notes with the clerk of court. The lower court rendered judgment declaring the 1936 judgment reestablished and ordering the defendant to deliver the land to the plaintiffs without requiring any payment, as the deposited Japanese war notes were legal tender and considered lost for the defendant. The defendant appealed.
ISSUE
Whether the tender of payment and consignation of Japanese war notes by the plaintiffs relieved them from liability, which depends on whether the defendant had reason to refuse the tender of payment made after the lapse of five years from the entry of the 1936 judgment and before the institution of the action to enforce it in 1944.
RULING
The Supreme Court held that the defendant had a valid legal reason to refuse the tender of payment. The 1936 judgment, after the lapse of five years from its entry, was no longer executory by motion and had become dormant. It could only be enforced by a separate action to revive it. The plaintiffs could not compel acceptance based on the original contract, as it had merged into the 1936 judgment, nor based on that judgment itself, as it was dormant and not yet revived by a new judgment in the enforcement action. The consignation of the depreciated Japanese war notes did not relieve the plaintiffs from liability because the defendant’s refusal to accept was justified. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the plaintiffs’ action was for the revival of the dormant judgment, and until a new judgment revived it, they could not enforce the old one. The tender and deposit were ineffectual.