G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant. VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.

FACTS

Petitioners, an association of hotel and motel operators and one of its member hotels, filed a petition for prohibition against the City Mayor of Manila to challenge Ordinance No. 4760, enacted on June 13, 1963. The ordinance amended and inserted sections into the city’s compilation, imposing, among other things: an annual license fee of P6,000 for first-class and P4,500 for second-class motels; a requirement for owners/managers to have guests fill up a detailed registration form in a lobby open to public view, with the records kept and open for inspection by the Mayor or Chief of Police; classification of motels with minimum facility requirements (e.g., telephone in each room, dining room); a prohibition against accepting persons under 18 unless accompanied by parents or a guardian; a prohibition against leasing a room more than twice every 24 hours; and penalties including automatic license cancellation for subsequent convictions. Petitioners alleged the ordinance was beyond the city’s power to enact regarding motels, unconstitutional for violating due process as arbitrary, oppressive, vague, and an invasion of privacy and against self-incrimination. The lower court issued a preliminary injunction and, after a stipulation of facts and memoranda, declared the ordinance unconstitutional and void, making the injunction permanent.

ISSUE

Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional for violating the due process clause.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment. The ordinance is a valid exercise of police power and does not violate due process. The presumption of validity attaches to the ordinance, and petitioners failed to present evidence to overcome this presumption. The objectives of the ordinance—to curb immorality, regulate a business affected with public interest, and protect public morals, health, and welfare—are within the scope of police power. The license fees are not confiscatory but regulatory. The registration requirement is a reasonable regulation to monitor establishments and does not constitute an unlawful invasion of privacy or a violation against self-incrimination, as the guests themselves are not parties to the case and the requirement is a condition for engaging in a regulated business. The classification of motels and the facility requirements are based on reasonable distinctions. The restrictions on minors and frequency of room leasing are directly related to the permissible objective of minimizing illicit relationships. The penalty provision is a valid exercise of regulatory authority. The ordinance is not vague, and its provisions are sufficiently clear. The lower court erred in declaring the ordinance unconstitutional without any evidence to support the alleged constitutional infirmities.