GR L 20266; (January, 1967) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-20266 January 31, 1967
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VI, and HERMINIO G. TEVES, respondents.
FACTS
On June 30, 1960, respondent Herminio G. Teves entered into a contract with the National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) authorizing him to act as its agent in exporting rice and importing collateral goods through barter. The contract stipulated a price for the rice and required Teves to import commodities with a total C&F price equal to the rice’s value. Subsequently, the President suspended all projected rice exports, including Teves’s. Teves then sought and obtained authority from the President and his cabinet on October 26, 1960, to import the collateral commodities ahead of exportation, subject to verification of his foreign contractual commitments and a 120-day revalidated license. From April 17, 1961, to January 12, 1962, Teves imported twenty-two shipments of merchandise, paying the corresponding customs duties and taxes. On January 12, 1962, the Economic Coordinator requested the Commissioner of Customs to withhold goods imported under NARIC’s name pending clearance. The shipments were withheld. Following a Cabinet decision, the matter was referred to the Secretary of Justice. Teves requested the release of the goods upon filing surety bonds, to which the Secretary of Justice acceded in an indorsement dated April 25, 1962, noting the issue was sub judice but interposing no objection to release upon filing bonds. Teves posted surety bonds totaling P294,620.25 from Meridian Assurance Corporation and Fieldmen’s Insurance Company, which were accepted by the Commissioner, and the importations were released. Teves then filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking to restrain the enforcement of the January 12, 1962 directive and to compel the cancellation of the bonds. Respondent Judge Gaudencio Cloribel issued an order on August 29, 1962, granting a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Commissioner to cancel the bonds. The Commissioner opposed, citing lack of jurisdiction, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and that mandamus lies only for ministerial acts. The Commissioner’s motions for reconsideration were denied. Hence, the Commissioner filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the cancellation of the surety bonds.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, declaring the orders and writ issued by the respondent judge null and void. The Court held that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the preliminary mandatory injunction. The power to issue such injunctions should be exercised sparingly and only in cases of extreme urgency, where the right is very clear, and where considerations of relative inconvenience favor the applicant. In this case, Teves’s right was not clear and certain; the legality of his importations under the NARIC barter agreement was precisely the subject of judicial determination. The bonds were filed to protect the government’s interests pending this determination. Canceling the bonds would effectively decide the main case in favor of Teves, rendering further proceedings a useless ceremony and leaving the government without security. This constituted a clear abuse of discretion. The Court made permanent the preliminary injunction it had issued, directed the dismissal of the civil case below, and imposed costs against Teves.
