GR L 20146; (September, 1964) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-20146; September 30, 1964
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VIRGILIO OPLADO and VISITACION FERNANDEZ GUYOT, defendants-appellees.
FACTS
Virgilio Oplado and Visitacion Fernandez Guyot were charged with adultery in an amended information filed before the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The prosecution was repeatedly ready to proceed to trial against Oplado. However, the trial was postponed multiple times due to the failure to apprehend and arrest the co-accused, Visitacion Fernandez Guyot, who remained at large.
When the case was called on March 5, 1962, and Guyot was still not apprehended, the trial court, upon motion of Oplado and over the prosecution’s objection, ordered the provisional dismissal of the entire case. The City Fiscal appealed this order, arguing that the dismissal was contrary to law since the prosecution was ready to try Oplado separately despite his co-accused’s absence.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in ordering the provisional dismissal of the adultery case against both accused due to the absence of one accused, when the prosecution and the present accused were ready for trial.
RULING
Yes, the trial court erred. The Supreme Court set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case. The legal logic is anchored on the settled doctrine that in adultery prosecutions, while both guilty parties must be included in the complaint if both are living, they need not be tried together. Jurisprudence establishes that one accused may be tried separately under various circumstances, such as when the co-accused has died, cannot be apprehended, or is entitled to a separate trial.
The Court cited precedents like U.S. vs. De la Torre and U.S. vs. Gallegos, which held that the trial of one defendant can proceed independently. The old rule under General Orders No. 58 granted a co-defendant the right to demand a separate trial, while the present Rule 115 makes it discretionary. Here, the trial court abused its discretion. Granting a provisional dismissal, ostensibly to protect Oplado’s right to a speedy trial, was illogical when the immediate remedy was to proceed with the trial for which both he and the prosecution were ready. Delaying via dismissal, rather than holding the available trial, contravened the very right to a speedy disposition it purported to uphold. The case was ordered remanded for further proceedings against Oplado.