G.R. No. L-18878. March 30, 1963.
CELSO A. FERNANDEZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. CECILIO LEDESMA, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Celso A. Fernandez was appointed and confirmed as Chief of Police of Basilan City. On April 28, 1959, Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo informed Fernandez by letter that the President had terminated his services and designated Cecilio Ledesma in his stead. Ledesma’s appointment was subsequently confirmed. Fernandez, who had been previously suspended following criminal charges but was later acquitted, filed a quo warranto action seeking reinstatement. He argued his removal was unconstitutional, having been effected without cause as required by law.
The Court of First Instance of Basilan dismissed the complaint. It upheld the President’s action as a valid exercise of discretionary removal power granted under Section 17 of Republic Act No. 288 , the Charter of Basilan City. Fernandez appealed directly to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law.

ISSUE

Whether the President’s termination of Fernandez’s service as Chief of Police, without stating a cause, constitutes an illegal removal in violation of the Constitution.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, ruling the termination was lawful. The legal logic hinges on the statutory tenure of the office. Section 17 of R.A. No. 288 explicitly states: “the President may remove at his discretion any of said appointive officers with the exception of the municipal judge, who may be removed only according to law.” The Court emphasized the deliberate distinction made by Congress: the municipal judge enjoys security of tenure and can only be removed for cause, while other appointive city officers, including the Chief of Police, serve at the pleasure of the President.
The Court rejected Fernandez’s invocation of constitutional provisions and jurisprudence (De los Santos v. Mallare, Lacson v. Roque) requiring cause for removal, as those cases involved positions with a fixed statutory term. Here, no fixed term of office is prescribed for the Chief of Police under the city charter. The legislative intent, as evidenced by the clear statutory language, was to make the continuance in office dependent upon the President’s discretion. Consequently, the President’s act was not a “removal” in the constitutional sense that requires cause, but a lawful termination of a tenure held at pleasure. The designation of a replacement simply ended Fernandez’s tenure, which had no fixed duration. The power of Congress to create an office with such a tenure at the pleasure of the appointing authority is settled.