GR L 18399; (February, 1963) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-18399. February 28, 1963.
MARCOS M. CALO, petitioner-appellant, vs. FRANCISCO MAGNO, respondent-appellee.
FACTS
Petitioner Marcos M. Calo sought an injunction and damages from the Court of First Instance of Agusan to restrain respondent Francisco Magno, the Acting Treasurer of Butuan City, from enforcing a distraint and levy on his properties for delinquent real property taxes amounting to P797.91. Calo contended that Magno’s designation as Acting City Treasurer by the President under Commonwealth Act No. 588 was null and void, arguing it contravened the Charter of Butuan City ( Republic Act No. 523 ). He asserted that Magno consequently lacked authority to issue the order of distraint and levy. The parties submitted an agreed stipulation of facts confirming Magno’s designation, his qualification and performance of duties since 1955, and the detail of the duly appointed City Treasurer, Quirico Battad, Sr., to the Department of Finance. The stipulation also noted Calo had previously paid other taxes to Magno’s office and had earlier challenged the designation’s legality to executive officials, who advised him it was valid.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the respondent, Francisco Magno, validly holds the authority as Acting City Treasurer of Butuan to collect taxes and issue the order of distraint and levy against the petitioner’s properties.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision dismissing the petition. The legal logic rests on two principal grounds. First, the designation of respondent Magno as Acting City Treasurer was valid. The detail of the permanent City Treasurer, Battad, to the Department of Finance created a temporary vacancy in the office. Under Commonwealth Act No. 588 , the President is empowered to designate any qualified person to temporarily perform the duties of such an office. This designation is a lawful exercise of executive power to ensure the continuity of essential public services, like tax collection. The Court rejected the argument that this violated the city charter, as the presidential power under CA 588 applies to fill temporary vacancies.
Second, and decisively, the Court held that an injunction is not a permissible remedy to restrain the collection of a tax. The petitioner’s action, which fundamentally sought to challenge Magno’s authority to hold office, was in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding. However, such a proceeding was not available to Calo, as he was not a claimant to the office himself, and any such action would be time-barred. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that Magno’s designation was defective, he would be considered a de facto officer. The acts of a de facto officer, performed under color of title, are valid and cannot be collaterally attacked in an injunction suit. The validity of his title can only be questioned directly in a quo warranto proceeding by the proper party. Therefore, Magno’s acts in issuing the distraint and levy were legally effective for tax collection purposes, and the injunction was properly denied.