G.R. Nos. L-18223 and L-18224. September 30, 1963.
COMMERCIAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC ARMORED CAR SERVICE CORPORATION and DAMASO PEREZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

FACTS

Defendant-appellant Damaso Perez filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. He claimed he was unaware of the specific nature of the power of attorney that Ramon Racelis used, purportedly signed by Perez, to secure loans from the appellee bank for the Republic Armored Car Service Corporation and Republic Credit Corporation. Perez contended that Racelis exceeded his authority in binding him as a surety for these loans. The motion referenced a photostatic copy of a power of attorney presented at the trial, but this copy was not submitted to the Supreme Court for examination.
However, Perez attached to his motion a copy of a power of attorney he allegedly executed on October 22, 1952. While not explicitly stated to be the exact document used by Racelis, the Court proceeded to examine its contents. The power of attorney granted Racelis broad authority to negotiate loans from various financial institutions and to execute all necessary documents, acting in Perez’s best interests.

ISSUE

Whether the newly presented power of attorney provided sufficient authority for Ramon Racelis to bind Damaso Perez as a surety for the loans obtained from the plaintiff bank, thereby warranting a new trial.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the motion for a new trial. The legal logic proceeds as follows: First, the Court could not rule on Perez’s initial claim regarding the specific photostatic copy from the trial, as it was not submitted for review. Second, even assuming the attached 1952 power of attorney was the one utilized, its terms were sufficiently broad to authorize Racelis’s actions. The document expressly authorized Racelis to negotiate loans from banking institutions and to execute all requisite documents, which encompassed obtaining the credits in question.
Furthermore, the Court noted that Racelis signed the loan documents “Damaso Perez by Ramon Racelis,” and these contracts expressly stipulated Perez’s joint and several liability. This negated Perez’s contention that he was merely a guarantor. Finally, the promissory notes were attached to the complaint. Under procedural rules, if Perez claimed his agent lacked authority to execute them, he was required to specifically deny their authenticity under oath in his answer. His failure to do so constituted a waiver, precluding him from raising the issue of authority belatedly. Thus, no newly discovered evidence justified a new trial.