G.R. No. L-16876. November 30, 1961.
ABELARDO APORTADERA, petitioner-appellant, vs. MANUEL C. SOTTO, respondent-appellee.

FACTS

In the November 1959 elections for Vice-Governor of Davao, respondent Manuel Sotto was proclaimed winner over petitioner Abelardo Aportadera. Aportadera subsequently filed a quo warranto proceeding, challenging Sotto’s eligibility. The petitioner alleged that at the time of the election, Sotto was not a qualified voter of Davao Province because he was still a registered voter in Manila. Sotto had registered as a new voter in Davao City on October 3, 1959, without first securing the cancellation of his Manila registration. He only filed an application for cancellation in Manila on October 30, 1959, which was 34 days beyond the legal period. Aportadera contended that by subscribing to a voter’s affidavit in Davao stating he was not registered elsewhere, Sotto committed a felony under the Revised Penal Code, thereby disqualifying himself as a voter and becoming ineligible for the provincial office.
The Court of First Instance of Davao granted Sotto’s motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a cause of action. Aportadera appealed directly to the Supreme Court, raising purely legal questions.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether respondent Manuel Sotto was a “qualified voter” of Davao province at the time of the election, as required by Section 2071 of the Revised Administrative Code for eligibility to the office of Vice-Governor.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, ruling that Sotto was a qualified voter. The Court rejected both grounds raised by Aportadera. First, the Court held that registration is not a qualification for the possession of the right of suffrage but is merely a procedural requirement for its exercise. Citing established jurisprudence (Yra v. Abaño, Vivero v. Murillo, Larena v. Teves), the Court emphasized that the right to vote exists prior to registration; registration does not confer the right. This principle is anchored on Article V of the 1935 Constitution, which enumerates the qualifications for suffrage (citizenship, age, literacy, residence) and does not include registration. To construe Section 98 of the Revised Election Code as adding registration as a substantive qualification would render it unconstitutional for amending the Constitution by mere statute. Therefore, even assuming Sotto’s registration in Davao was defective due to his prior Manila registration, this did not negate his status as a qualified voter if he possessed the constitutional and statutory qualifications, which were not disputed.
Second, the Court found no legal disqualification. The disqualifications to vote are exclusively listed in Section 99 of the Revised Election Code (e.g., final judgment of imprisonment, crime against property, insanity). The alleged felony of making a false affidavit in registration is not among these statutory disqualifications. For subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 99 to apply, a final judgment of conviction is required, which was admittedly absent. Thus, Sotto was not disqualified. Consequently, he was a qualified voter of Davao and eligible for the office of Vice-Governor.