GR L 16453; (July, 1920) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-16453; July 29, 1920
MARIA TRINIDAD DE GUZMAN and PRIMITIVO MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. RAMON FERNANDEZ Y LOPEZ, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
The plaintiffs-appellants appealed a case to the Supreme Court. The record on appeal was defective because it did not contain a transcript of the testimony taken during the trial in the court below. The official stenographer who took the notes had gone to the United States on a long vacation without extending and certifying the transcript. The stenographic notes were left with the clerk of the trial court. The appellants moved to extend the period for filing their brief and to return the record to the trial court for a new trial, arguing the defective record made it impossible for the Supreme Court to review the evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellants are entitled to have the appealed judgment set aside and a new trial ordered due to a defective record that lacks a transcript of the trial testimony.
RULING:
No, not automatically. The Supreme Court held that while the defect in the record prevents a review of the evidence, the appellant must first exercise due diligence to correct the defect before being entitled to a new trial. The Court, invoking its duty under Section 501 of the Code of Civil Procedure to complete the record in the interest of justice, outlined the procedure to be followed. It suspended the period for filing the appellant’s brief and deferred action on the motion for a new trial. The appellants were given an opportunity to prove they exhausted all reasonable efforts to correct the record by: (1) submitting a stipulation with the appellee on the substance of the testimony or facts; (2) submitting an extended transcript from another competent stenographer; or (3) having the original stenographer extend the notes. The Court emphasized that if the appellant, without fault, finds it impracticable to correct the record despite due diligence, a new trial would be granted. Conversely, a lack of diligence by the appellant would be treated as an abandonment of the objection to the defect. The appellee was also expected to cooperate, as a failure to do so could result in the reversal of the judgment in his favor and a remand for a new trial.