G.R. No. L-15669; February 28, 1962
SEVERINO ARAMBULO, Mayor of Calamba, Laguna, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPALITY OF CALAMBA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Severino Arambulo, as Mayor of Calamba, Laguna, dismissed thirteen municipal patrolmen in 1956. Three dismissed patrolmen, Juan Isip, Pablo Palupit, and Cornelio Luna, successfully secured a court order for their reinstatement. They then sought payment of their back salaries from the Municipality of Calamba. However, citing a Presidential Circular holding officials personally liable for salaries during periods of illegal separation, the Provincial Auditor refused to pass the payment. Consequently, the patrolmen sued Mayor Arambulo in his personal capacity before the Justice of the Peace (JP) Court to recover their back salaries. Arambulo filed a third-party complaint against the Municipality. The Municipality, in its answer, admitted liability and stated it had appropriated funds for the payment.
The JP Court rendered judgment, ordering the Municipality to pay the back salaries and absolving Mayor Arambulo from personal liability. Dissatisfied, the patrolmen appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI), but only insofar as the judgment failed to hold Arambulo personally liable. The Municipality did not appeal. During the pendency of this appeal, the JP Court issued a writ of execution against the Municipality. The CFI later issued an alias writ. The Municipality moved to intervene in the appeal and to set aside the writs of execution.

ISSUE

Whether the appeal taken by the patrolmen vacated the entire judgment of the JP Court, including the part against the non-appealing Municipality, thereby allowing the Municipality to intervene and rendering the writs of execution improper.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision setting aside the alias writ of execution and allowing the Municipality to intervene. The legal logic is grounded in the effect of an appeal from an inferior court. Under Section 9, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, an appeal vacates the entire judgment of the inferior court. The case is to be tried de novo in the CFI “as though the same had never been tried before and had been originally there commenced.” This means the JP Court’s judgment is deemed inexistent for all purposes. Consequently, all issues are reopened for determination by the CFI, regardless of which party appealed or the scope of that appeal. The Court cited Royal Shirt Factory, Inc. vs. Co Bon Tic, which held that any and all issues involved in a case originating in an inferior court are thrown open upon appeal.
Thus, the patrolmen’s appeal, even if limited in their intent, vacated the whole judgment. The Municipality’s admission of liability in the JP Court was likewise vacated and was no longer binding. The Municipality was therefore entitled to intervene in the appeal to contest its liability anew. Furthermore, since the judgment was vacated, execution could not properly issue from it. Only the court that rendered a final and executory judgment can issue its writ of execution (Rule 39, Sec. 8). The JP Court’s judgment was no longer final due to the appeal, and the CFI, acting as an appellate court trying the case de novo, had no authority to issue an alias writ for its enforcement.