G.R. No. L-15388; January 31, 1961
DORA PERKINS ANDERSON, petitioner-appellee, vs. IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, oppositor-appellant.

FACTS

Special proceedings were initiated by Dora Perkins Anderson for the probate of the will of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins and for the appointment of a special administrator. Alfonso Ponce Enrile was appointed as the special administrator. Idonah Slade Perkins, the surviving spouse of the deceased, opposed the probate of the will. Subsequently, about two years later, the special administrator filed a petition seeking authority to sell various personal effects of the estate, such as clothes, books, and appliances, alleging they were deteriorating in physical condition and value. The lower court, despite Idonah’s vigorous opposition, authorized the sale. Idonah opposed the sale on grounds that most properties were conjugal or her exclusive property and that there had been unauthorized removals of estate assets. Her motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the probate court erred in authorizing the special administrator to sell the personal properties of the estate over the surviving spouse’s opposition claiming ownership rights therein.

RULING

Yes, the authorization was premature and improper. The Court clarified that a special administrator’s power to sell under Rule 81, Section 2 of the Rules of Court is not limited to perishable property; it extends to “other property as the court orders sold” to preserve the estate’s value. However, this power must be exercised with due regard to outstanding claims of ownership. Here, the surviving spouse, Idonah Slade Perkins, asserted a claim that a substantial portion of the personal properties were either conjugal assets or her exclusive property. The records showed no prior proceedings to segregate her alleged separate property or to liquidate the conjugal partnership. Until such ownership issues are adjudicated or an agreement is reached, a sale disposing of the very subject of the dispute is clearly premature. The items in question, like furniture and appliances, were not of such urgent perishability that they could not be preserved through proper storage in available residential properties. The lower court’s order was issued without adequately inquiring into the merits of the oppositor’s claims or providing her a reasonable opportunity to specify items she sought to exclude from the sale. Therefore, the order authorizing the sale was set aside.