G.R. No. L-1268; September 30, 1947
RUFINO KABILING, petitioner, vs. EMILIO PEÑA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, THE SHERIFF OF MANILA, and ROSA NITORREDA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Rufino Kabiling, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 312 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, filed an injunction suit against respondent Rosa Nitorreda and other city officials, asserting a better right to occupy stalls Nos. 250 to 253 of the Quinta Market. He sought a preliminary injunction to restrain his ejectment. After hearing, the court (presided by respondent Judge Emilio Peña) rendered a decision on December 11, 1946, declaring Nitorreda the lawful occupant of the stalls, sentencing Kabiling to pay her damages of P5 daily from August 10, 1946, until he vacates, and setting aside the preliminary injunction. On December 24, 1946, Nitorreda filed an urgent motion for execution of the judgment. Kabiling opposed, arguing no special reasons justified immediate execution pending appeal and offering to post a bond to answer for damages. By order dated January 3, 1947, Judge Peña granted the motion and decreed execution to issue. Kabiling filed the present petition to annul the execution order and other related orders, contending the judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. He also argued the case should have been dismissed in light of Republic Act No. 37 and Department Order No. 32 of the Department of Finance.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order for execution of the judgment pending appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Court held that Civil Case No. 312 was an action for injunction. Under Rule 39, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action for injunction shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal, unless otherwise ordered by the court. No such order was issued here. Therefore, the general rule applied, and execution was properly issued. Regarding Republic Act No. 37 and Department Order No. 32, the Court noted, citing its decision in Co Chiong and Lim Chiu Guan vs. Dinglasan, that the Secretary of Finance had suspended the operation of said Department Order, and without it or a similar regulation, Republic Act No. 37 was not susceptible of execution. The petition was dismissed with costs.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Justice Perfecto dissented, voting to grant the petition and set aside the execution order. He argued that under Rule 39, Section 2, execution before the expiration of the time to appeal may issue only upon good reasons stated in a special order. The respondent judge’s order of January 3, 1947, cited Section 4 of Rule 39 but stated no reasons at all, making it violative of Section 2. Furthermore, Kabiling’s opposition, citing the requirement of special reasons and his willingness to file a supersedeas bond as authorized by Section 2, was well-founded. The dissent concluded there was a clear violation of law entitling Kabiling to relief.