G.R. No. L-12054; January 31, 1959
JOSE ESCAY, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE TEODORO, SR., ETC., ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Jose Escay is the assignee of a 20-year leasehold of Hacienda Esmeralda in Occidental Negros, stipulated to commence from the 1927-1928 crop year. Fausto Gonzales, Jr., the owner and lessor, filed a suit (Civil Case No. 2868) on November 27, 1953, under Article 1683 of the New Civil Code, to have Escay allow him to cultivate the land, alleging the lease would end with the 1953-1954 crop. The court issued a preliminary injunction restraining Escay from preventing Gonzales’s entry. Escay’s motions to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case as premature (contending the lease would expire after the 1954-1955 crop) were denied. After the Supreme Court dismissed Escay’s certiorari petition challenging the lower court’s jurisdiction, he filed an amended answer in the lower court. This amended answer reiterated that the lease would not expire until after the 1954-1955 crop year and included an additional counterclaim for damages. The damages alleged resulted from Gonzales’s entry under the injunction, which prevented Escay from cultivating sugar crops from 1954-1955 to 1960-1961, claiming actual expenses, lost profits for 1954-1955, and expected yearly profits for six subsequent crop years. The lower court initially refused to act on the amended answer due to the absence of a formal motion for leave to file it. After Escay filed such a motion, the court denied it on February 4, 1957, stating admission would further delay a case pending since November 1953. A motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting the present certiorari petition.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the admission of Jose Escay’s amended answer.

RULING

No, the lower court did not commit a grave abuse of discretion. First, the initial amended answer filed on January 9, 1957, with a notice for hearing on January 10, 1957, provided insufficient notice to adverse counsel under Rule 26, section 4 of the Rules of Court, justifying the court’s initial refusal to act on it. Second, regarding the denial of the subsequent motion for reconsideration, the lower court was motivated by a desire to avoid further delay in a case that had been pending for over three years. The Supreme Court noted that the amended answer did not alter the theory of the case from the original answer; the only new matter pertained to damages from the preliminary injunction, which could be properly alleged in a supplemental pleading. Therefore, the refusal to admit the amended answer to prevent delay did not constitute a grave abuse of discretion warranting certiorari relief. The petition was denied, the preliminary injunction issued by the Supreme Court was lifted, and costs were imposed on the petitioner.