G.R. No. L-1084, November 26, 1902
JOHN FISCHER, petitioner, vs. BYRON S. AMBLER, judge of Court of First Instance of Manila, respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner John Fischer was the defendant in the case of Sparravohn vs. Fischer, wherein judgment was rendered against him on July 15, 1902. On July 28, 1902, Fischer filed a paper in court stating that he excepted to the judgment. Subsequently, during the same term, he presented a bill of exceptions to the trial judge, the respondent Judge Byron S. Ambler. The judge refused to sign and certify the bill of exceptions, contending that no exceptions were taken by Fischer during the trial and that the exception to the judgment was not taken “forthwith” as required by law, since it was merely made by filing a paper and not in any other manner. Fischer then filed this petition for mandamus under Section 499 of the Code of Procedure to compel the judge to sign and certify the bill of exceptions.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent judge can refuse to sign and certify a bill of exceptions on the ground that the exception to the judgment was not taken in due time or in due form, thereby effectively dismissing the appeal.

RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered the issuance of a writ of mandamus. The Court ruled that the determination of whether the requirements for perfecting an appeal (such as taking exceptions in due time and form) have been complied with is a question of law that ultimately rests with the Supreme Court, not the trial court. This is to prevent the trial court from rendering the right of appeal illusory through an erroneous determination. The Court held that under Section 500 of the Code of Procedure, all questions regarding compliance with the method of bringing actions to the Supreme Court are to be determined by the Supreme Court.

Regarding the specific objection, the Court interpreted the requirement under Section 142 that a party must “forthwith” inform the court of an exception to mean “within a reasonable time,” which varies with the circumstances. Whether the 13-day delay in this case was unreasonable would be a matter for determination upon a motion to dismiss the appeal in the Supreme Court, not a ground for the trial judge to refuse the bill of exceptions.

Since the respondent’s answer admitted that an exception to the judgment was taken (though disputing its timeliness and form), and the truth of the tendered bill was not otherwise denied, the judge was directed to sign and certify it. The judge could add any facts he deemed necessary to properly present the question of whether the exception was duly taken. The case was retained for further proceedings if the respondent alleged the bill was incorrect in other particulars.

Note: A separate concurring opinion expressed the view that Section 142, requiring exceptions to be taken “forthwith,” applied only to rulings during trial and not to written exceptions to a final judgment, and disagreed with defining “forthwith” as “within a reasonable time.”