GR L 101; (December, 1945) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-101; December 20, 1945
Haydee Herras Teehankee, petitioner, vs. Leopoldo Rovira, Antonio Quirino, and Pompeyo Diaz, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Haydee Herras Teehankee is a political detainee, delivered by the U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps to the Commonwealth Government and confined in the Correctional Institution for Women. On October 2, 1945, through her husband, she filed a petition with the People’s Court invoking Executive Order No. 65 (dated September 3, 1945). She prayed for immediate release on the ground that no evidence existed to charge her, or, alternatively, for the court to fix bail for her provisional liberty. On October 4, Judge Antonio Quirino required the Solicitor General to comment. On October 5, the Solicitor General recommended bail be set at P50,000. On October 9, Presiding Judge Leopoldo Rovira referred the petition to the Fifth Division but opined it should be denied despite the Solicitor General’s recommendation. On the same day, Associate Judge Pompeyo Diaz entered an order denying the petition, citing the gravity of the offense as inferred from the recommended bail amount. A motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus, alleging the judges acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Respondent Judge Diaz, in his answer, defended the order as issued under the express mandate of law, citing Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 .
ISSUE
1. Whether Article III, Section 1(16) of the Commonwealth Constitution (the bail provision) is applicable to the petitioner’s case.
2. Whether a hearing should be held on the application for bail with the attendance of the petitioner and the Solicitor General or his representative.
3. If so, what kind of hearing it should be.
RULING
1. Yes, Article III, Section 1(16) of the Commonwealth Constitution is applicable. The constitutional mandate that “all persons shall before conviction be bailable… except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong” applies to all persons, not only those against whom a formal complaint or information has been filed. The right to bail can be invoked from the moment a person is placed under arrest, detention, or restraint. There is no legal or just reason to deny its benefits to one not yet formally charged, especially since the presumption of innocence applies even more strongly in such a case compared to one already formally charged.
2. A hearing should be held. The Court’s ruling implies that a proper hearing is necessary to determine the application for bail in accordance with constitutional and statutory requirements.
3. The hearing must be one where the prosecution bears the burden of proof. Following the Rules of Court (specifically Rule 110, Section 7), on an application for bail by a person in custody for a capital offense, the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution. The hearing should allow for this burden to be discharged.
*(Note: The provided text ends with the Court framing the issues for decision. The final resolution on the specific orders of the respondent judges is not contained in the excerpt, but the legal principles applicable to the case are established.)*
