G.R. No. L-10038; March 31, 1915
MARCELO DE LEON, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent-appellee.

FACTS:
1. Marcelo de Leon was convicted of illegal detention and initially sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court modified the sentence to eighteen (18) years of reclusión temporal.
2. On November 19, 1909, Acting Governor-General W. Cameron Forbes granted him a conditional pardon, commuting the unexecuted portion of his sentence. The condition was that he remain as a free colonist at the Iwahig Penal Colony for five years and maintain good conduct.
3. De Leon was transferred to Iwahig but was later returned to Bilibid Prison.
4. On November 17, 1913, Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison issued another conditional pardon. The condition was that de Leon not be guilty of any crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more for the rest of his original sentence’s unexpired term.
5. Before this 1913 pardon was delivered to or accepted by de Leon, Governor-General Harrison, upon representations from prison authorities, directed its cancellation. This cancellation was communicated via a letter from the Executive Secretary to the Director of Prisons on June 15, 1914.
6. De Leon filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Manila, which was denied. He appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether a conditional pardon, issued by the Chief Executive but revoked before its delivery to and acceptance by the convict, is valid and effective to justify the release of the convict.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the writ of habeas corpus.

A pardon is an act of grace from the executive authority. For a pardon to become a completed and valid act, delivery and acceptance are essential. Until it is delivered to the convict or someone on his behalf, it remains a mere intended favor that can be revoked by the executive at any time.

In this case, the conditional pardon granted by Governor-General Harrison on November 17, 1913, was canceled by his own order before it was ever delivered to or accepted by Marcelo de Leon. Consequently, the pardon never took effect. The petitioner, therefore, remained lawfully imprisoned under his original sentence.

The Court cited the analogous American case of In re De Puy, which established the doctrine that a pardon is incomplete without delivery and acceptance, and may be revoked prior to those acts. Since the pardon was revoked before completion, de Leon was not entitled to release.

The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.