G.R. No. L-10020, December 29, 1958
ANTONIO ALACAR, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO, ET AL., respondents-appellants.

FACTS

Antonio Alacar, a member of the Baguio City police force, was suspended from office on July 26, 1955, due to a complaint for misconduct. After investigation, the City Council found him guilty on August 31, 1955. Alacar appealed this decision to the Commissioner of Civil Service within the period prescribed by Republic Act No. 557 . Since the 60-day suspension period under the Act expired on September 26, 1955, Alacar requested immediate reinstatement. He was reinstated provisionally but without pay pending the final outcome of his appeal. Subsequently, this reinstatement order was revoked, and he was considered dismissed from service. Alacar then filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, seeking reinstatement with back pay until the final termination of his administrative case. The trial court granted the petition, ordering his immediate reinstatement and payment of salary from September 26, 1955, but denied damages, finding that respondents acted in good faith. Respondents appealed.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner Antonio Alacar is entitled to reinstatement pending the final determination of his administrative case on appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court, holding that Alacar is not entitled to reinstatement. The Court applied Section 3 of Republic Act No. 557 , which provides that a suspended member of the police force shall be reinstated ipso facto after 60 days if the case is not finally decided, unless the delay is due to the fault, negligence, or petition of the accused. The Court cited the precedent in Martinez vs. Municipal Mayor of Labason, et al., where it was ruled that an appeal by the accused constitutes a voluntary act that delays the final disposition of the case. Here, Alacar’s case was decided by the City Council within the 60-day period (on August 31, 1955), but the finality was delayed due to his own appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service. This appeal, being his voluntary act, constituted a delay attributable to him, thus preventing his reinstatement under the law. The Court emphasized that mandamus is not appropriate where the petitioner does not have a clear legal right to reinstatement, especially after being found guilty by the competent body, and where issuing the writ would not promote substantial justice or could be injurious to public interest. Costs were imposed against petitioner Alacar.
Separate Opinion (Concurring and Dissenting by Justice Montemayor):
Justice Montemayor disagreed with the majority’s interpretation, arguing that an appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service is a remedy expressly provided by Republic Act No. 557 and cannot be considered a “fault, negligence, or petition” causing delay under Section 3. He contended that penalizing a party for taking a bona fide appeal is contrary to law, which encourages appeals to correct errors. He noted that the appeal process is designed to be expeditious, with fixed periods for filing and decision. However, in view of the majority ruling, he concurred with the understanding that if the Commissioner of Civil Service ultimately decides in Alacar’s favor, he should be reinstated and paid his salary for the entire suspension period.