GR 890; (August, 1902) (Digest)
G.R. No. 890 : August 29, 1902
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. VICENTE VILLAMOR, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
On September 28, 1900, Guillermo Ballesta was the chief of the Filipino insurrectionary forces in Bangued, Abra. The defendant, Vicente Villamor, a Filipino resident, served as his secretary. On that date, soldiers under Ballesta’s orders seized Bernardo Dumasal. Dumasal was tried by a council of war presided over by Ballesta and composed of local chiefs. Villamor acted as the secretary of this council. Dumasal was convicted of being a traitor for having purchased cows for the Americans and was sentenced to death. Villamor signed the written judgment as secretary and provided a copy to the officers for execution but had neither voice nor vote in the council’s deliberations. The trial and conviction were conducted pursuant to laws and regulations promulgated by superior officials of the insurrectionary forces. Villamor was convicted in the lower court and sentenced to death. On appeal, he moved for discharge based on the amnesty proclamation of July 4, 1902, a motion joined by the Solicitor-General.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendant, Vicente Villamor, is entitled to the benefits of the amnesty proclamation of July 4, 1902, thereby warranting his discharge.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the motion for discharge. The Court held that assuming the evidence established Villamor’s guilt for the crime charged (a point it expressly declined to decide), the evidence also demonstrated that he had been pardoned by the amnesty proclamation. The Court found that Villamor was an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands who, at the time of the act, was participating in the insurrection against the United States. The execution of Dumasal was an offense of a political character, committed in pursuance of orders issued by civil or military insurrectionary authorities superior in rank to the defendant. Therefore, Villamor was declared entitled to the benefit of the amnesty proclamation, conditioned upon his filing the prescribed oath in court. The case was to be remanded to the lower court with instructions to discharge him upon compliance, with costs de oficio.