GR 78239; (February, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989
SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner, vs. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto, former Assistant City Treasurer of Calbayog City, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for estafa through falsification of public documents and sentenced to imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed her conviction. While her motion for reconsideration was pending, she was granted an absolute pardon by President Marcos in December 1984. Monsanto requested reinstatement to her former position, arguing the pardon wiped out the crime and restored her rights as if never interrupted. The Ministry of Finance initially ruled she could be reinstated without a new appointment, effective from the pardon date, but required her to satisfy the civil indemnity.
The Office of the President, through Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., reversed this ruling. It held that an absolute pardon does not entitle a former public officer to automatic reinstatement; instead, the officer must secure a reappointment. The Office cited government policy and jurisprudence, emphasizing that only an acquittal, not a pardon, justifies reinstatement and backpay. It also affirmed her civil liability for indemnity, which a pardon does not remit. Monsanto’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this petition.
ISSUE
Whether a public officer granted an absolute pardon is entitled to automatic reinstatement to her former position without a new appointment.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court denied the petition, ruling that Monsanto is not entitled to automatic reinstatement. The legal logic centers on the nature and effects of a pardon under Philippine law. An absolute pardon exempts the individual from the punishment imposed for a crime but does not obliterate the fact of conviction or the accessory penalties mandated by law unless expressly remitted. Monsanto’s conviction carried the accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification from public office, arising from the penalty of prision mayor. This disqualification, by operation of the Revised Penal Code, persists unless the pardon expressly remits it.
The pardon granted to Monsanto did not contain an explicit restoration of her right to hold public office. Consequently, the accessory penalty of disqualification remained, legally barring her from assuming her former position. Reinstatement to a public office, which is a public trust, cannot be automatic; it requires a new appointment to ensure the appointing authority’s discretion and confidence in the officer’s fitness. The Court further upheld her civil liability for indemnity, as a pardon does not extinguish civil obligations. Thus, while the pardon relieved her from imprisonment, it did not restore her eligibility for public employment or erase the civil liability from her conviction.