G.R. No. 76265 and G.R. No. 83280, April 22, 1992.
VIRGINIA CALALANG, petitioner, vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION, LUCIA DE LA CRUZ, CONSTANCIO SIMANGAN and IGLESIA NI KRISTO, respondents.

AUGUSTO M. DE LEON, JOSE M. DE CASTRO, JOSE A. PANLILEO, FELICIDAD VERGARA VDA. DE PINEDA, FERNANDO L. VITUG I, FERNANDO M. VITUG II, FERNANDO M. VITUG III, FAUSTINO TOBIA, ELENA M. OSTREA and FELISA C. CRISTOBAL-GENEROSO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BISHOP ERAÑO MANALO, respondents.

FACTS

The consolidated petitions involve a parcel of land, Lot 671-A of the Piedad Estate in Quezon City. The petitioners are individual lot owners who claim to have purchased their respective portions in the 1950s from Amando Clemente, the alleged registered owner of Lot 671-A evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 16212, who converted it into Clemville Subdivision. Lot 671-A is part of a bigger parcel, Lot 671, claimed by respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK), which bought it from Lucia dela Cruz in 1975. Lucia dela Cruz was adjudged the rightful owner of Lot 671 in the case of dela Cruz v. dela Cruz (130 SCRA 666 [1984]). INK began fencing the area and posted “No Trespassing” signs referencing the Supreme Court decision.
In G.R. No. 76265 , petitioner Virginia Calalang, claiming to be a registered owner of a portion of Lot 671-A, learned of INK’s claim in August 1986. She moved to intervene in a pending consulta case (LRC 1978) before the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA), questioning the registrability of documents and the reconstitution of TCT No. RT-58 in Lucia dela Cruz’s name. Her motion was denied, invoking the dela Cruz ruling that TCT RT-58 is valid. Her motion for reconsideration was also denied. She then filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds initiated cancellation proceedings against over 100 titles, including Calalang’s, based on the dela Cruz decision. Calalang filed a supplemental petition to include the trial judge and her children as parties.
In G.R. No. 83280, the petitioners, also claiming ownership from Amando Clemente with corresponding titles from the 1950s, alleged peaceful possession and payment of taxes. In August 1985, INK began fencing the entire Clemville Subdivision and constructing structures. The petitioners filed an injunction case (Civil Case No. Q-45767). The trial court denied their prayer for a preliminary injunction, citing the dela Cruz decision which declared the reconstituted title (TCT No. RT-52) null and void and stating petitioners could acquire no more rights than their source. The Court of Appeals set aside this order and directed a proper hearing. However, the trial court later granted INK’s motion to dismiss the complaint, ruling that the dela Cruz decision was binding and petitioners’ titles, being derived from a void reconstituted title, were also void. The Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal.

ISSUE

The central issue is whether the petitioners’ titles to portions of Lot 671-A, derived from Amando Clemente, are valid and indefeasible against the claim of INK, which holds a title to the larger Lot 671 based on the Supreme Court’s final decision in dela Cruz v. dela Cruz declaring the reconstituted title of Lucia dela Cruz as valid.

RULING

The Supreme Court DISMISSED both petitions for lack of merit. The Court upheld the final and binding effect of its decision in dela Cruz v. dela Cruz, which validated the title of Lucia dela Cruz (and subsequently INK) to Lot 671. The Court ruled that INK’s title over Lot 671, which includes Lot 671-A, had become incontrovertible and indefeasible. The petitioners’ titles, which were derived from a reconstituted title (TCT No. RT-52) declared void in the dela Cruz case, were consequently also null and void. The Court emphasized that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can only be altered in a direct proceeding. Reopening the legality of INK’s title would defeat the purpose of the Torrens system, which seeks to ensure stability and quiet titled lands. The Court found that the petitioners were not deprived of due process as the dela Cruz decision was binding, and their remedy, if any, was a direct attack against INK’s title, not a collateral one through an injunction suit. The Court concluded that for public interest and to maintain the integrity of the Torrens system, all transfer certificates of title derived from the void reconstituted title must be annulled.