G.R. No. L-67787 April 18, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ROSIE CUARESMA and HON. JUDGE VICTORIANO B. DE LA CRUZ, respondents.

FACTS

An information for oral defamation was filed against Rosie Cuaresma on August 21, 1978. The charge stemmed from her allegedly imputing that the complainant was the paramour of her husband, a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio. Cuaresma moved to quash, arguing that under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, such a case must be initiated by a complaint filed by the offended party, not by an information filed by the fiscal. The respondent judge denied the motion but, citing Fernandez v. Lantin, ordered the fiscal to file the verified complaint of the offended party within ten days. A verified complaint, subscribed by the complainant, was filed on August 4, 1980.
Before arraignment, Cuaresma filed a new motion to quash, this time alleging prescription. She argued that the original information filed in 1978 was void for violating Article 360 and thus did not interrupt the two-month prescriptive period for oral defamation. Consequently, she claimed the offense had prescribed long before the corrective verified complaint was filed in August 1980. The respondent judge agreed, ruling that the court only acquired jurisdiction upon the filing of the verified complaint on August 4, 1980, by which time the crime had already prescribed. The judge dismissed the case, and the fiscal’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the filing of the original information by the fiscal, though procedurally defective for violating Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the crime of oral defamation.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition and annulled the respondent judge’s dismissal order. The Court held that the filing of the original information, despite its procedural flaw, effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. The ruling in Fernandez v. Lantin, which the respondent judge relied upon, explicitly stated that the error of filing an information instead of a complaint could be corrected without dismissing the case. This correction was precisely accomplished when the verified complaint was subsequently filed on August 4, 1980. The prescriptive period, having been interrupted by the initial filing on August 21, 1978, did not continue to run. Therefore, the offense had not prescribed when the verified complaint was filed. The respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by dismissing the case on the ground of prescription, as his order was based on a misapplication of the law. The Court emphasized that the timely filing of the information vested the court with authority over the case, and the subsequent submission of the verified complaint cured the initial procedural defect without affecting the interruption of prescription.