GR 49097; (March, 1944) (CRITIQUE)
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THE AI-ASSISTED CRITIQUE
The Court’s reasoning in G. Vda. de Angeles v. City of Davao hinges on a formalistic distinction between “revival” and “re-enactment,” which is analytically tenuous. By treating Resolution No. 2 as a valid re-enactment of the subsisting but legally defective Ordinance No. 381, the Court effectively permitted the municipality to cure an ultra vires act through a procedural maneuver. The original ordinance was void ab initio for exceeding the statutory fee limit set by Act No. 4142 ; treating it as merely “subsisting” because not judicially annulled ignores the principle that an act contrary to law is void from its inception. This approach risks allowing local governments to maintain patently illegal ordinances until challenged, then “re-enact” them under new authority, undermining the supremacy of legislative statutes and the doctrine of void ab initio.

The decision’s validation of the re-enacted ordinance under Commonwealth Act No. 155 raises concerns about retroactive application and fairness. While the new law granted broader authority to charge “reasonable slaughter fees,” the Court applied it to validate fees collected under a previously illegal rate structure without a new, substantive legislative determination by the city board that the P2 per head fee was “reasonable” under the new standard. The resolution merely blanketly re-adopted all old ordinances. This bypasses the requisite legislative discretion and public interest evaluation mandated by the new enabling act, reducing the police power exercise to a ministerial act that rubber-stamps past excesses.

Ultimately, the ruling establishes a problematic precedent that municipal ordinances invalid due to statutory conflict can be resuscitated by a generic re-enactment resolution after a change in the law, without addressing the original defect’s substantive impact. This blurs the line between curative legislation and procedural validation, potentially encouraging municipalities to retain overreaching ordinances in hopes of future legal changes. The concurrence without separate opinions suggests a missed opportunity to scrutinize the separation of powers implications, as the judicial sanction of this process may inadvertently weaken legislative control over local fee structures and erode protections against arbitrary exactions.