G.R. No. L-48679; August 11, 1943
EUSEBIO S. MILLAR, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOROTEO NADRES, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

A judgment was secured by plaintiff Eusebio S. Millar against defendant Doroteo Nadres in the justice of the peace court of Tayabas. The provincial sheriff sold defendant’s two parcels of land at public auction to satisfy the judgment, and plaintiff was the highest bidder. Defendant failed to redeem the property within the prescribed time. A final deed of sale was executed in plaintiff’s favor on March 8, 1934, and transfer certificates of title were issued to him. Subsequently, plaintiff granted defendant an option to repurchase the land until December 31, 1934. Defendant paid P200 in November 1934 but failed to pay the balance by the deadline. Upon defendant’s second request, plaintiff renewed the option to expire on April 30, 1938, under conditions that the balance would carry 12% interest and that upon defendant’s default, the option would be automatically cancelled, with prior payments treated as rentals at P20 per month from September 1936. Defendant made a second payment of P200 in November 1935 but failed to pay the balance by April 30, 1938. Plaintiff then initiated ejectment proceedings. The parties mutually agreed to dismiss the ejectment case and submit the ownership question to the Court of First Instance. After trial, the court declared defendant’s option forfeited, ordered him to pay monthly rental of P20 from May 1938 (applying the P400 paid thereto), vacate the property, and deliver possession to plaintiff. Defendant appealed.

ISSUE

Whether the defendant-appellant’s right to repurchase the property was properly declared forfeited by the trial court.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court construed the appellant’s notice of appeal, which specified that the issues were “ninety percent” questions of law, as a waiver of any question of fact, limiting the appeal to the legal issue specified. The facts found by the trial court showed that plaintiff granted a second option with a specific expiry date (April 30, 1938), not an indefinite extension. This second option and its extensions were given without consideration from the defendant to the plaintiff. Therefore, the provisions of Article 1128 of the Civil Code (regarding fixing a period by the court when none is specified) did not apply. The first option had expired, and the subsequent period was a grace period which the plaintiff was justified in terminating after more than three years of defendant’s inaction. Furthermore, defendant had also failed to pay overdue land taxes as initially agreed, leading to a tax sale of the property which plaintiff purchased, giving plaintiff a double title (from the judicial sale and the tax sale). The judgment was affirmed with costs against the appellant.
CONCURRING OPINION (BOCOBO, J.):
Justice Bocobo concurred in the result, applying Article 1504 of the Civil Code. He viewed the contractual relation as a perfected contract of sale, not a mere option, because the redemption period had expired, a final deed was executed, and partial payments were made. Under Article 1504, the buyer may pay even after the term expires, but only until a judicial or notarial demand for rescission is made. Here, the plaintiff’s filing of the action to recover the land constituted the judicial demand for rescission. After such demand, the court cannot grant a new term for payment. The plaintiff had been indulgent for nearly four years, and his judicial action to recover the property was justified. Therefore, it was immaterial whether defendant received the letter extending the deadline to April 30, 1938.