GR 48468; (October, 1941) (Digest)
G.R. No. 48468 ; October 24, 1941
ILOILO TRADING CENTER AND EXCHANGE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE SOTERO RODAS, ETC., and MANILA TRADING AND SUPPLY CO., respondents.
FACTS
The petitioner, Iloilo Trading Center and Exchange, filed an original petition for certiorari to annul an order issued by the respondent Judge Sotero Rodas. The order granted a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of a judgment pending the petitioner’s appeal. The judgment, entered on March 31, 1941, was against the petitioner and in favor of the respondent Manila Trading and Supply Co. for the sum of P1,677.22 with interest and costs. In the order, the respondent judge stated that the purpose of the appeal was just to delay and that it would be prejudicial to the plaintiff to stay execution during the pendency of the appeal. The order granted the motion for execution unless a supersedeas bond was posted for the amount of the judgment with interest for one year.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution of the judgment pending appeal based on the finding that the appeal was taken for the purpose of delay.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the order of the respondent judge. The Court held that Section 2 of Rule 38 (now relevant provisions under the Rules of Court concerning execution pending appeal) empowers the Court of First Instance, in its discretion, to order the execution of its judgment pending appeal, provided it states good reasons for doing so. The Court cited its recent decision in Jacinto Presbitero et al. vs. Judge Sotero Rodas et al., where it ruled that a court’s statement that an appeal was taken for the purpose of delay constitutes a good and sufficient reason to issue execution pending appeal, as dilatory tactics hinder the administration of justice. The petitioner failed to adduce facts to show that the trial judge’s conclusion was arbitrary or baseless. The Court also rejected the petitioner’s argument about its sound financial condition, stating that the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal is not predicated on the same grounds as a writ of preliminary attachment and that the petitioner could file the required supersedeas bond if confident in its appeal. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Supreme Court was dissolved, and the respondent judge’s order was affirmed, with costs.