G.R. No. 47454 , June 6, 1941
Adriano Trinidad, Petitioner, vs. Andres S. Siochi, Justice of the Peace of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Another, Respondents.

FACTS

The petitioner, Adriano Trinidad, was accused of physical injuries (lesiones) in Criminal Case No. 2020 before the Justice of the Peace Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, presided over by respondent Judge Andres S. Siochi, with Pablo Mabulay as the complainant. The case was set for hearing on February 15, 1940. At the hearing, after the complaint was read and the accused pleaded not guilty, the complainant Mabulay requested a postponement. He stated that he had only learned of the hearing by chance at noon that same day and thus could not contact the lawyer he had specifically hired for the case. The petitioner’s lawyer opposed this motion, insisting on the accused’s right to a speedy trial. In view of this opposition, respondent Judge ordered the dismissal (sobreseimiento) of the case.
Later that same day, however, the complainant’s lawyer, Pedro Arteche, filed a motion demonstrating to the satisfaction of the Judge that neither he nor the complainant had been duly notified of the hearing. Convinced by this and considering the provisions of Article 107 of General Order No. 58, which declares it a right of every complainant to appear in person or by counsel at any stage of the trial to defend his rights, respondent Judge set aside the order of dismissal. He ordered the case to be reinstated and set for hearing on February 29, 1940. The petitioner, as the accused, filed an exception and motion for reconsideration against this order of February 16, 1940, which the Judge denied in an order dated March 26, 1940. The petitioner now assails these two orders via certiorari, contending that the Judge acted without authority and with grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the case, invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy.

ISSUE

Whether the writ of certiorari is the proper and timely remedy to assail the respondent Judge’s orders reinstating the criminal case, based on a claim of double jeopardy.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding it to be improper and premature. The Court ruled that the defense of double jeopardy is a special defense that must be invoked in a timely manner and proven by the party asserting it to be entitled to its benefits, as established in precedents such as U.S. v. Claveria and People v. Cabero. The proper time to raise this defense is during the trial, and the procedure for doing so is prescribed by Rule 113 of the new Rules of Court. The defense must be presented to the trial court that is hearing the case, not for the first time on appeal or in a special civil action.
Since the petitioner had not yet presented his double jeopardy defense to the respondent Judge in the lower court, the Judge had not been given an opportunity to rule on its viability. Therefore, the remedy of certiorari was premature. Furthermore, certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the ordinary remedy of appeal was available to the petitioner. The Court ordered the petitioner to follow the procedures outlined in Rules 113 and 118 of the new Rules of Court. Costs were taxed against the petitioner.