GR 45325; (February, 1937) (Digest)
G.R. No. 45325 ; February 27, 1937
FRANCIS LUSK, petitioner, vs. FREDERIC STEVENS, LEON ROSENTHAL and GONZALO P. NAVA, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Francis Lusk filed a quo warranto action in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila against respondents, seeking to annul their election as directors of the Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. and to hold a new election. The CFI ruled in favor of Lusk. Respondents appealed and presented their bill of exceptions. However, before the bill was approved, the CFI judge, upon Lusk’s ex parte motion, issued an order for the immediate execution of the judgment, citing that the judgment was self-executing under Section 208 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that special reasons warranted immediate execution to carry on the corporation’s business. Respondents then filed a certiorari petition with the Court of Appeals, which annulled the CFI’s execution order, ruling it was issued in excess of jurisdiction. Lusk now petitions the Supreme Court to review and set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to issue an order for immediate execution of its judgment in a quo warranto case pending appeal, and if so, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion.
RULING
Yes, the CFI had jurisdiction and did not act with grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court held: (1) Under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a CFI has discretionary power to order execution pending appeal upon special reasons. The existence of such special reasons confers this discretionary power. (2) The statement of these special reasons in the bill of exceptions is a mere formality and not mandatory under Section 144. Their omission does not invalidate the writ of execution. (3) Although a bill of exceptions that omits the special reasons is defective, the writ of execution remains valid if the court, in its discretion, found special reasons to exist. The CFI judge had found the reasons alleged in Lusk’s motion well-founded and necessary for the corporation’s operations. Since no abuse of discretion was shown, the execution order was valid. The preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals was dissolved.
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