G.R. No. 42808 . January 31, 1989.
ROSARIO VDA. DE SUANES, petitioner, vs. THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Bureau of Public Highways), respondents.

FACTS

Artemio A. Suanes served as a construction capataz for the Bureau of Public Highways (BPH) in Batangas until June 30, 1970, and thereafter for the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas until his death on June 21, 1973. His death certificate listed the cause as “Cardio-respiratory Arrest due to Cerebrovascular Accident.” His widow, Rosario Vda. de Suanes, filed a claim for death benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The BPH initially controverted the claim, arguing lack of causal relation between the illness and employment, failure to comply with notice requirements, and that the proper employer was the Provincial Engineer’s Office. The Workmen’s Compensation Unit (WCU) Referee dismissed the claim for petitioner’s alleged failure to appear at a hearing. Petitioner moved to set aside the dismissal, explaining she had moved and did not receive the notice. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission (WCC) denied her motion for not being accompanied by an affidavit of merits as required by its rules.

ISSUE

The primary issues were: (1) whether the WCC correctly denied the motion to set aside the dismissal order for lack of an affidavit of merits; (2) whether the claim had prescribed; and (3) whether the death was compensable.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the WCC decision and granted the claim. On the procedural issue, the Court held that while the WCC rules required an affidavit of merits, the purpose was to allow evaluation of the motion’s grounds. Petitioner’s motion itself clearly alleged the grounds of excusable negligence—her change of address and non-receipt of notice—which were substantiated by the records. The motion functionally served the purpose of an affidavit, making its denial a technicality that defeated substantial justice. On prescription, the Court noted the claim was filed within the statutory period. Any delay in resolving the proper party respondent (the Provincial Engineer was impleaded nine years after the petition was filed) was attributable to the Court itself and should not prejudice the petitioner under the principle of nunc pro tunc. On the merits, the Court applied the established presumption of compensability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Since the illness supervened during employment, the burden shifted to the employer to prove non-compensability. Neither the BPH nor the Provincial Engineer presented any evidence to rebut this presumption, relying only on formal defenses. With the presumption unrebutted, the claim was deemed compensable. The award included reimbursement for medical expenses and applicable death benefits.