G.R. No. L-42371 February 12, 1980
CRESENCIA VDA. DE EUSTAQUIO, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and DANILO DE GUIA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Cresencia Vda. de Eustaquio, widow of Rafael Eustaquio, filed a claim for death compensation benefits after her husband was electrocuted and died on September 19, 1972, while performing electrical installation work on a house. The deceased had been employed as an electrician by private respondent Danilo de Guia since 1967, earning an average weekly wage of P50.00. The claim was filed on November 27, 1972. After several postponements initiated by the respondent, a hearing was held on September 11, 1973, where the petitioner presented her evidence. When the case was called again for the respondent to present his evidence, he failed to appear, leading the Acting Referee to consider the case submitted for decision. The Referee subsequently awarded death benefits and burial expenses to the petitioner.
The respondent employer moved for reconsideration, arguing he was denied the opportunity to present evidence and that no employer-employee relationship existed. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission reversed the Referee’s award, absolving the respondent primarily on the ground that no employer-employee relationship was established, noting the respondent lacked a business license and capital for a construction business.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the Workmen’s Compensation Commission erred in reversing the award, specifically in its finding that no employer-employee relationship existed between the deceased and the respondent.

RULING

The Supreme Court set aside the Commission’s decision and reinstated the award. The legal logic proceeds from two key points. First, on the substantive issue of employer-employee relationship, the Court found the Commission’s conclusion baseless as it ignored unrebutted evidence. Testimonies from the petitioner’s witnesses established that the deceased was hired by the respondent as an electrician at a daily rate, reported to work under set hours, and his hiring, though verbal, was corroborated by a co-worker. The Commission’s reliance on the respondent’s lack of business capital or license was misplaced, as these are not determinative of the existence of an employment relationship, which is fundamentally governed by the employer’s right to control the employee’s work.
Second, and decisively, the Court ruled that the respondent was deemed to have waived his right to contest the claim due to late controversion. The fatal accident occurred on September 19, 1972, but the respondent only filed his controversion on March 16, 1973. Under Section 45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the employer must controvert a claim within ten days from knowledge of the injury or fourteen days from its occurrence. The nearly six-month delay constituted a failure to comply with this mandatory requirement. Consequently, by operation of law, the respondent is presumed to have accepted the compensability of the claim and waived all non-jurisdictional defenses, including the challenge to the employer-employee relationship. The Court also clarified that while factual findings of the Commission are generally conclusive, it may review them when, as here, the conclusions are not supported by the evidence. The respondent was thus ordered to pay the awarded benefits.