GR 41144; (December, 1980) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-41144 December 29, 1980
IGNACIO BUENBRAZO, petitioner, vs. HON. GERONIMO R. MARAVE, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch II, and JOSE ABELARDO, respondents.
FACTS
In a forcible entry case originally decided by the Ozamiz City Court, the complaint of Jose Abelardo was dismissed, and he was ordered to pay attorney’s fees to Ignacio Buenbrazo. Abelardo appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI), which affirmed the city court’s decision. Abelardo then filed a notice of appeal and a record on appeal, seeking to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. He contended the CFI’s factual findings lacked substantial evidence and its conclusions were contrary to law.
Buenbrazo moved to dismiss this second appeal, arguing that under Section 45 of the Judiciary Law, as amended by Republic Act No. 6031 , the decision of the CFI in cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of city or municipal courts is generally final. The respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss, relying on a Court of Appeals ruling that allowed a petition for review to the CA when an inferior court’s decision is affirmed by the CFI. Buenbrazo assailed this order via a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance correctly gave due course to Abelardo’s appeal to the Court of Appeals by means of a record on appeal.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition, ruling that the lower court erred. The applicable law is Section 45 of the Judiciary Law, as amended by R.A. No. 6031 . The general rule under its third paragraph is that a CFI decision, rendered in its appellate jurisdiction over cases originally falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of municipal or city courts, is final and unappealable. A key condition for this finality is that the CFI’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and its conclusions are not clearly against law and jurisprudence.
While Section 45 provides that the Supreme Court may, in its discretion and upon a petition by the aggrieved party, require via certiorari that such a case be certified to it for review on questions of law, it does not provide for an ordinary appeal as a matter of right. An appeal by record on appeal presupposes a right to appeal. In contrast, the review mechanism under Section 45 is discretionary with the Supreme Court, akin to a petition for review under Rule 45. Therefore, Abelardo could not appeal as of right via a record on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The proper mode, if any, was a discretionary petition for review, not an ordinary appeal. Consequently, the CFI’s order giving due course to the record on appeal was set aside, and its decision affirming the city court was declared final and executory.