G.R. No. L-36052 December 29, 1973
Severino Macavinta, Jr., petitioner, vs. The People of the Philippines and The Court of Appeals, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Severino Macavinta, Jr., a member of the Philippine Bar convicted of estafa by the Court of Appeals, filed an urgent motion for leave to personally argue orally in support of a second motion for reconsideration of this Court’s resolution denying his petition for review. His motion was premised on vague grounds of “the interest of justice and expediency.” This Court had previously denied his second motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. In his motion, Macavinta imputed negligence to his counsel of record, Attorney Sergio L. Guadiz, for the late filing. Consequently, the Court required Atty. Guadiz to comment on the allegation.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner’s motion for leave to argue orally should be granted, and whether his counsel was negligent in the late filing of the second motion for reconsideration.

RULING

The Court denied the motion for leave to argue orally. The motion lacked legal foundation, being based solely on general appeals to justice and expediency without citing any statutory provision or judicial precedent. As a lawyer, the petitioner should have known that such a motion, devoid of merit, could not be granted. The Court examined the substantive aspect, noting that the petitioner’s counsel had invoked constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. However, the petitioner failed to demonstrate the relevancy of these safeguards to his case. The Court of Appeals decision, penned by Justice Gatmaitan, was thorough in its factual and legal analysis, particularly condemning the misuse of client funds. An allegation of denial of due process or equal protection, which implies arbitrariness, was unconvincing against this detailed adjudication. Procedurally, the denial was justified by the late filing. The well-settled principle that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel applies, making the tardiness fatal to the motion.
Regarding Atty. Guadiz, the Court found his explanation in his comment unsatisfactory. He incorrectly asserted that the second motion for reconsideration was filed on time. Records showed the denial of the petition was received on February 21, 1973. After extensions, the deadline for the first motion for reconsideration was March 24, 1973, which was met. The denial of that first motion was received on April 24, 1973, leaving only one day to file a second motion. Instead, the motion for leave was filed on May 4, 1973, clearly late. Atty. Guadiz’s failure to accurately compute the procedural deadlines and his categorical but erroneous denial of tardiness demonstrated a lack of care. Therefore, the Court admonished Atty. Guadiz to exercise greater diligence in fulfilling his duties to his client, especially in adhering to procedural timetables.