GR 30111 12; (February, 1973) (Digest)
G.R. Nos. L-30111-12 & L-30365-66 February 27, 1973
THE SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, LIMITED, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, et al., respondents. NUMERIANO JACOLO, ERNESTO DEDEL and JACINTO MONOY, petitioners, vs. HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, et al., respondents.
FACTS
Respondents Francisca Timosa and Chiveniano Go filed civil actions for damages in the Court of First Instance of Agusan, presided by respondent Judge Manuel Lopez Enage. Petitioner Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd., represented by counsel Atty. Alfred P. Deen of Cebu City, filed its answer. The other petitioners, Numeriano Jacolo, Ernesto Dedel, and Jacinto Monoy, were represented by the Butuan City law firm of Deen, Mercado and Cataluna. A critical error occurred when the court, likely confusing the similarly named law offices, served all subsequent notices only to the Butuan firm. Consequently, Shell’s counsel of record in Cebu received no notification of any further proceedings.
For petitioners Jacolo, Dedel, and Monoy, their counsel, Atty. Lydio J. Cataluna, appeared at a hearing on July 8, 1968. He informed the court that he had separated from the law firm handling the case, the records were with his former partner, and the petitioners were not notified of the hearing. He moved for a postponement. Respondent Judge denied the motion and instead considered the cases submitted for decision.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, by rendering decisions against the petitioners in violation of their constitutional right to procedural due process.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petitions for certiorari and nullified the decisions. The Court held that the proceedings suffered from a fatal denial of procedural due process, a constitutional infirmity that rendered the judgments void.
For Shell Company, the denial was patent. Procedural due process requires that a party be notified and given an opportunity to be heard at every stage. Since Shell’s counsel of record was never notified after filing the answer, the company was deprived of any chance to participate, present evidence, or cross-examine witnesses. The Court, citing Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca and Florendo v. Florendo, emphasized that a judgment rendered without lawful hearing is void.
For petitioners Jacolo, et al., the denial was equally grave. The respondent Judge’s refusal to grant a postponement under the circumstances—where counsel explained his recent separation from the firm and the lack of notice to clients—was arbitrary. It effectively barred them from presenting their defense. The Court ruled that a judge must exercise discretion judiciously to ensure parties are heard; a refusal to postpone under such valid grounds violates fundamental fairness. Since the case against Shell required a remand for a new hearing, justice demanded that all petitioners be afforded the same opportunity to present their defenses. The writs of certiorari were therefore granted.