G.R. No. L-29431. February 24, 1971.
SIMEONA FLORES-REYES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GUILLERMO ZAMORA and CECILIA REYES, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Plaintiff-appellant Simeona Flores-Reyes, the lessee of a parcel of land, filed an unlawful detainer complaint in the City Court of Manila against defendants-appellees Guillermo Zamora and Cecilia Reyes. She alleged that she had subleased a portion of the land to the defendants on a month-to-month basis and that, despite repeated demands since October 1965, they refused to vacate the premises. The City Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila.
In their answer, the defendants generally denied the substantive allegations and asserted special defenses, including that they had been religiously paying rent, claimed to be builders in good faith, and contended that the plaintiff, not being the owner, could not file the complaint. The CFI, while finding for the plaintiff on the factual allegations, dismissed the complaint. It held that the plaintiff failed to comply with Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court because her written demand letter gave the defendants only five days to vacate, instead of the fifteen-day period required by the rule for leases of land.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the unlawful detainer complaint on the ground of non-compliance with the demand requirement under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

RULING

Yes, the CFI committed reversible error. The Supreme Court clarified the proper interpretation of Section 2, Rule 70. The provision states that a landlord cannot bring an action for failure to pay rent or comply with lease conditions unless the tenant has failed to do so “for a period of fifteen (15) days… after demand.” The Court explained that this fifteen-day period refers to the mandatory interval that must elapse between the making of a valid demand and the filing of the complaint in court. It does not prescribe a specific number of days that must be stated within the text of the demand letter itself.
Applying this interpretation, the Court examined the facts. Plaintiff’s demand letter (Exhibit B) was dated January 24, 1966, and the registry return card (Exhibit B-2) showed defendants received it on February 3, 1966. The complaint was filed on February 28, 1966. Therefore, twenty-five days had passed from the defendants’ receipt of the demand until the initiation of the suit, which more than satisfied the fifteen-day waiting period mandated by the rule. The CFI’s reliance on Gallarde v. Moran was misplaced, as that case emphasized the need for the demand to be made “at least fifteen days… before bringing the action,” a condition fulfilled here. Consequently, the judgment of dismissal was reversed. The Supreme Court entered a new judgment ordering the defendants to vacate the premises and to pay attorney’s fees.