G.R. No. 28897 , January 27, 1928
SEGUNDA SURBANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE DIEGO GLORIA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, and THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF TAYABAS, respondents.

DOCTRINE:
The period of prescription for a crime is interrupted from the commencement of judicial proceedings against the offender. The prescriptive period begins to run anew only when such proceedings are terminated without the accused being convicted.

FACTS

1. On December 27, 1926, a quarrel occurred between Segunda Surbano (petitioner) and the offended party, during which insulting words were uttered.
2. On December 28, 1926, the offended party filed a complaint for grave insults (injurias graves) with the local justice of the peace court. A preliminary investigation was conducted.
3. On February 18, 1927, the justice of the peace court dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence.
4. On March 15, 1927, the offended party filed a new complaint, this time directly with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tayabas. The CFI referred the case to the justice of the peace of the provincial capital for preliminary investigation, which resulted in a finding of probable cause. The case was then elevated to the CFI.
5. After trial, the CFI, presided by Judge Diego Gloria, convicted Surbano of the lesser crime of slight insults (injurias leves).
6. Surbano filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that the CFI had no jurisdiction because the crime of slight insults had already prescribed. She contended that since the complaint charged grave insults but the conviction was for slight insults, and the two-month prescriptive period for slight insults had lapsed, the court lost jurisdiction.

ISSUE

Did the crime of slight insults for which Segunda Surbano was convicted prescribe, thereby depriving the Court of First Instance of jurisdiction?

RULING

NO, the crime of slight insults had not prescribed. The CFI retained jurisdiction, and its judgment is valid.

The Supreme Court denied Surbano’s petition. The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the theoretical question of whether a CFI loses jurisdiction if it convicts an accused of a lesser offense that has prescribed, because in this case, the crime had not prescribed.

The Court applied Article 131 of the Penal Code, which provides that the prescriptive period for crimes is interrupted from the commencement of proceedings against the offender and begins to run again only when such proceedings are terminated without conviction.

Application:
1. Prescriptive Period: The crime of slight insults prescribes in two months (Art. 131[5], Penal Code).
2. Interruption: The period was interrupted on December 28, 1926, when the offended party filed the first complaint with the justice of the peace.
3. Recommencement: The interrupted period began to run anew only on February 18, 1927, when the first complaint was dismissed.
4. Calculation: From February 18, 1927, to March 15, 1927 (the date the new complaint was filed with the CFI), only 25 days had elapsed. This is well within the two-month (60-day) prescriptive period.

Therefore, the offense had not prescribed when the second complaint was filed. Consequently, the CFI had jurisdiction to try and convict Surbano. The writ of certiorari was denied, the temporary suspension of the judgment’s execution was lifted, and the CFI’s judgment was declared valid and effective. Costs were imposed on the petitioner.