G.R. No. L-28620, February 24, 1928
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANDRES ANCASAN, defendant-appellant.

Ponente: J. Ostrand

FACTS

On May 3, 1927, during a celebration in Banganga, Davao, a duet between Domingo Bancailan and Eugeniano Felizardo turned into a fight when Bancailan became angry at Felizardo’s higher pitch. Bancailan tried to throw Felizardo but ended up falling with Felizardo on top of him. While they were in this position, the accused Andres Ancasan, a friend of Bancailan, struck Felizardo on the back of the head with a heavy cudgel. The wound became infected with tetanus, leading to Felizardo’s death a few days later. Before his death, in a conscious moment, Felizardo told his wife that Ancasan had inflicted the wound and enjoined her to take care of their children; he lost consciousness shortly after and died within an hour. Ancasan and Bancailan were charged with homicide. The trial court acquitted Bancailan but convicted Ancasan, sentencing him to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal. Ancasan appealed, contesting the credibility of prosecution witnesses and the admissibility of the deceased’s statement to his wife as a dying declaration.

ISSUE

1. Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the statement of the deceased to his wife as a dying declaration.

RULING

1. On the credibility of witnesses: The Supreme Court found the first assignment of error without merit. The testimony of the prosecution witnesses was neither unreasonable nor lacking in veracity, and the trial court’s assessment of credibility is generally respected.

2. On the admissibility of the dying declaration: The Supreme Court held that the statement was properly admitted as a dying declaration. Contrary to the appellant’s contention, it is not necessary for the declarant to expressly state that he has lost all hope of recovery. It is sufficient that the circumstances inevitably lead to the conclusion that the declarant did not expect to survive. Here, the deceased’s act of enjoining his wife to care for their children, made shortly before he lost consciousness and died, clearly indicated he had lost hope of recovery.

On the Penalty: The Court noted the existence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery (aquallevia), as the deceased was struck from behind. However, two extenuating circumstances were also present: (1) the defendant was intoxicated, and (2) he probably did not intend to kill the deceased. These extenuating circumstances offset the aggravating circumstance, warranting the imposition of the minimum penalty for homicide under the Revised Penal Code, which is reclusion temporal. The penalty imposed by the trial court was therefore correct.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED, with costs against the appellant.

Concurring Justices: Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real.